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Barbara Malament*
Sir Edward Coke, master of the turbulent political and legal arenas
of early Stuart England, ranks among his country's most influential
jurists. Recent historiography has given him an additional role of
special significance. His career is now considered a prism through which
we may see the impending triumph of industrial capitalism and its
ideological handmaiden, classical economic liberalism. Cast as spokes-
man for a burgeoning class of entrepreneurs, he is held to have served
them through a broad attack on monopolies and the intricate regu-
latory structure of the Tudor state and to have reshaped the common
law in conscious anticipation of laissez-faire precepts.
But Coke's career did not in fact fit this heuristic construct. He was
not among the venturesome merchants and manufacturers of his age
(1552-1634), and he was fickle in his regard for their interests. His
opposition to monopolies was selective; he challenged neither the fun-
damentals of the prevailing regulatory structure nor the paternalistic
ideas which supported it. In some instances his arguments resembled
those of economic liberals. But always his underlying principles were
as alien to the early nineteenth century as they were familiar to the
sixteenth.
Those who have missed the distinctly Tudor cast of Coke's thinking
have been either lawyers interested in establishing common law sanc-
tion for modem anti-trust theory1 or historians seeking an ideological
explanation for the origin of the Civil Wars. Long convinced that these
wars arose over divergent definitions of English liberties or the respec-
tive authority of Parliament and Crown, historians traditionally2 ad-
vanced a political interpretation of the protest against monopolies. It
went something like this: statutory proscription of monopolies consti-
tuted the first invasion of the King's absolute prerogative.3 It was
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1. Coke's views were cited, for example, in one of the most famous American anti.
trust cases, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51, 54 (1911). In this case, the
company's interpretation of the early common law would seem to be the more accurate.
See pp. 1345-58 infra.
2. For one important exception to the standard political argument, see 4 D. Hu&dE
HIsMRY OF ENGLAND 394 (rev. ed. 1850). As an early partisan of laissez.faire, Hume traced
the origins of that theory back to the monopoly controversy and argued that the House
of Commons had attempted to "give liberty to the trading part of the nation."
3. Following Fortescue, most Englishmen believed theirs to be a dominium politicum
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effected by Coke and his "patriot" friends, who were known defenders
of Parliament's jurisdiction in matters of taxation. Since the Crown
received considerable sums of money in return for its favors, what
Coke and his friends must have wanted was to remove the threat of
royal financial independence. Though generally plausible,4 this tradi-
tional analysis became suspect after the 1930's when historians began
reinterpreting the struggles between Court and Country. Once they
had settled upon an economic interpretation, historians found in the
opposition to monopolies a suggestion 5 that Coke and the parliamen-
tarians were early advocates of laissez-faire.
This suggestion threatens now to become dogmatic assertion. Yet
even proponents of the laissez-faire thesis differ significantly among
themselves. Ephraim Lipson,6 Eli Heckscher,7 and John N. Nef s for
example, cautiously suggested that Coke's views provided a link between
mercantilist and classical economic theory. They pointed to his "aver-
sion" to statutes regulating the terms of enclosure and apprenticeship
and his narrow construction of their provisions, the ability of later
litigants to cite his opinions when contesting modern forms of trade
et regale in which the Crown had a discretionary prerogative to act on the advice of Its
counsellors and also an inherent and absolute prerogative in matters such as defense and
foreign affairs. Exclusive trade privileges originated in an effort to encourage self-sufficiency
and to make England's international position more secure, hence the Crown claimed an
absolute right to grant such privileges-a right which Parliament challenged directly by
enacting the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3. For a lucid and exceptionally
good discussion of why Coke and the parliamentarians did not realize the radical impli-
cations of their action and of the extraordinary consensus in theory, see M. JUDsON, Tiit
CRISIS OF THE CONSTrUTION (1949).
4. It could not explain, however, Coke's repugnance to monopolies prior to his break
with the Court. Nor could it explain why adherents of the Court Party such as Lionel
Cranfield and even Francis Bacon urged reform from above-the abrogation of certain
odious monopolies by the King. For Cranfield's views, see D. WIrSON, Tim PiuvW CouN-
CILLORs IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1604-1629, at 45 (1940); for Bacon's views, see Advice
to Sir George Villiers in 2 Tm Wops OF BACON 375, 385 (1841), where he describes moo.
nopolies as "cankers of all trading" and urges that they not be admitted "under specious
colours of public good."
5. It is possible to interpret the Civil Wars as an economic conflict yet not ascribe to
the partisans different economic theories. This is what Lawrence Stone, Trevor-Roper and
R. H. Tawney have done, however tacitly, in their discussions of the gentry. As to mo-
nopolies, William H. Price has discussed the economic grievances regarding exclusive patents
without deducing an ideological framework. See Price, English Patents of Monopoly, 1
HArv. ECON. STUDIES 70 (1913). And insofar as any differences of theory did exist, George
Unwin suggested that they arose not because of any peculiar foresight or modernity but
simply because merchants tended to prosper under freer conditions of trade than did
manufacturers. Unwin's suggestion was hardly new and could not explain why so many
of the protests against monopolies originated from unemployed craftsmen as opposed to
thwarted merchants. But by revealing the conflict in mercantile and industrial Interests and
by enabling historians to assess how Court policy more nearly favored the latter, Unwh's
study helped explain the merchants' impatience under the early Stuarts. See G. UNwIN,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTI CENTURIES (1904).
6. 3 E. LIPSON, Tim EcONoMIsC HISTORY OF ENGLAND, especially at 283 (1931).
7. 1 E. HECsSCHER, MERCANTILISM 291-94 (M. Shapiro trans. 1935).
8. J. NEr, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 42 (1962).
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restraint, and the rhetoric of "free trade" which accompanied his
denunciation of monopolies. Yet they confined themselves to the long-
range implications of Coke's views. Nowhere did they ascribe to Coke
a conscious anticipation of laissez-faire.
The more extreme position was adopted first by Donald 0. Wagner9
who argued that monopolies were not inconsistent with prevailing legal
theory, that Coke deliberately distorted precedent in order to hold them
unlawful. His argument was then endorsed by Christopher Hill,10 who
believed that a "liberal" Coke would reinforce his general interpreta-
tion of the early Stuart period. Having politicized Tawney's thesis'1 of
an emergent capitalist ethos by linking Puritans, parliamentarians and
merchants, and having concluded that their opposition to the Court
was motivated by the latter's policy of industrial regulation, Hill placed
Coke among the enterprising and the individualistic. Through Hill's
interpretation, Coke became the ally of the Puritans, the spokesman
who created common law sanction for their laissez-faire demands.
I.
The facts of Coke's life, however, weaken Hill's general thesis. In a
career of 60 years, Sir Edward spent nearly 40 attached to the Court as
Solicitor and Attorney General, Chief Justice of the Court of Common
Pleas and of the King's Bench.12 By birth, he was a country gentleman
from Norfolk; by devotion, an Anglican;' 3 by conviction, a social con-
9. Wagner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 EcoN. Hisr. REv. 30 (1935).
See also Wagner, The Common Law and Free Enterprise: An Early Case of Monopoly, 7
EcoN. Hesr. REV. 217 (1937). In both articles, Wagner was attempting to refute R. H.
Tawney's proposition that the common law had an inherent bias in favor of economic
individualism. See Tawney, Introduction to T. WsoN, A DtscounsE Upox UsURY (1958).
10. Hill tentatively endorsed Wagner's findings in C. HILL, PuRITANmSm AND REvoLuTIo.
28 (1964). Then, after further research, he elaborated upon Wagner's thesis. C. Hu.L,
INTELLECTUAL ORIGsNS OF THE ENGLISH REvoLurION 225-65 (1965).
11. This famous thesis first appeared in R. H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND TIlE RISE OF
CAVrrALIsm (1926).
12. The dates of these appointments were 1592, 1593/94, 1606 and 1613 respectively.
13. "In his old age he agreed with the Puritans, but he continued to support the Estab-
lished Church." 1 J. CAmPBELL, THE LavEs OF THE CHIEF JuSTICES OF E.NGA #,N 353 (1873).
Coke's early views-his opinion of the Puritan demands at Hampton Court (1604). the
Commons' Apology of that same year, or even their Petition of 1610-are unknown. Apart
from his resistance to Church demands for the co-ordinate jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and
secular courts (which reflected a jealous regard for the common law rather than anti-
Anglican sentiment), Coke seems to have expressed himself on religious issues only after
1621. In that year he strongly demanded the stricter enforcement of recusancy laws, a
position he again took in 1625.
The question is whether anti-Papist, anti-Arminian fears unaccompanied by any (known)
sympathy for Calvinism justify calling Coke a "Puritan." Many loyal Anglicans shared his
fears; and on the basis of his denunciation of Dr. Montague in 1625 it would seem that
Coke's main concern was Elizabethan in its political emphasis on state unity and security
as opposed to theology. It should also be recalled that even in the debates leading to the
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servative. Like many of his contemporaries, he disapproved of inferiors
who sought to rise through the legal profession. At an assembly of
benchers of the Inner Temple held in February of 1601 Coke, then
Attorney General, ordered that "none hereafter shall be admitted into
this House... but only such as shall be of good parentage and of no
evil behaviour .... 1 4 Presumably, "good parentage" included country
gentlemen, for at the time Coke himself was both getting rich and
climbing the social ladder. In his private practice, he had acquired
many lucrative retainers. He had married an heiress, and upon her
death in 1598 he married another. Coke became so wealthy that in
1601 he was able to entertain Queen Elizabeth at Stoke Poges. When he
died he left some 99 estates and, according to Samuel Thorne,16 twice
that number had passed through his hands.
To the extent that Coke was willing to engage in land speculation,
he perhaps demonstrated a form of "capitalist spirit." But when it came
to more modem undertakings in trade or industry, Coke showed re-
markable scepticism. For one thing, he doubted the remunerative
possibilities of manufacturing, so much of which was in the hands of
monopolists. In his famous Charge to the Norwich Assizes delivered in
1607, Coke expressed his dislike of the monopolist and further observed
that he
for the most part useth at a deare rate to pay for his foolishnes:
For some of that profession have bene so wise, to sell twentie,
thirtie, or perhaps fortie pound land a yeare, and bestow most
part of the money in purchasing of a Monopolie: Thereby to anoy
and hinder the whole Publicke Weale for his owne privat benefit:
In which course he so well thriveth, as that by toyling some short
time, either in Starch, Vineger, or Aquavitae, he doth in the end
thereby purchase to himselfe an absolute beggerie, and for my
owne part, their purposes and practices considered, I can wish unto
them no better happinesse.16
Nor did Coke have any confidence in trading concerns. Though an
honorary member of the Spanish Company' 7 and, in his capacity as
Petition of Right in 1628 Coke's great contribution was political and not religious. 11.
HULME, THE LIFE OF SIR JOHN ELIOT 186-93 (1957). Coke was in no sense obsessed by
religious questions. He was not devout in his personal life but continued his nominal
allegiance to the Anglican Church.
14. 1 A CALENDAR OF THE INNER TEMPLE RECORDs 439 (F. Inderwick ed. 1896).
15. Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U.L, REv. 10, 13
(1951).
16. THE LoRD COKE, HIS SPEECH AND CHAcE, at Hb (1607). The speech was piratically
published by one Robert Pricket with, according to Coke, many errors and omissions,
Preface to 7 Co. Rep.
17. He seems to have been admitted in return for helping draft the Company's charter
of 1604. A. Fmzs, ALDERMAN COCKAYNE's PROJECT 157, 158 (1917).
1324
Vol. 76: 1321, 1967
Coke's "Economic Liberalism"
Attorney General, one of the draftsmen of the charter of the Virginia
Company, 8 he seems to have invested in neither.'0 He had been in his
30's when the trade depression following 1586 set in,O old enough to
appreciate the precariousness of commerce and to confirm his habit of
investing in land.
In this habit, Coke distinguished himself from many of his legal col-
leagues. Perhaps because so much of their practice was in London,
there seems to have been great temptation for them to invest in the
trading companies which were likewise centered there. Oliver St. John
was involved in the Providence Island Scheme;2' Sir Edwin Sandys, Sir
Thomas Roe, John Selden and Sir John Popham all had connections
with the Virginia Company.22 All were or became staunch opponents
of monopolies, at least the monopolies of others. As early as 1607, Coke
had come to share their views, but apparently not their economic
interests.
Even in his strictly legal capacity, Coke was not particularly sensi-
tive to commercial needs. Despite the increasing interest in problems
of joint-stock ownership, negotiable instruments, commercial contracts,
debt and insurance, he devoted no special attention to them in his
writings. The first of his Institutes dealt with land tenure, the second
with various statutes, the third with criminal law, and the fourth with
the jurisdiction of different courts. Taken together,2 the Institutes
come to over two thousand pages, only one of which treats of bank-
ruptcy and only one of forfeiture. Commercial contracts as such are
not even mentioned.
It might be objected that Coke set out to elucidate the laws of
England, and that with the exception of the usury and bankruptcy
statutes, these laws did not relate to business needs. But in the Institutes
the descriptive and the prescriptive were joined. Had Coke wanted to
make a point of commercial problems, he might easily have done so.
His colleagues may also have lacked foresight and failed to distinguish
18. F. IAND, FNGLs LAW AND THE RENAtsACE 31 (1901).
19. I am very much indebted to Professor Theodore K. Rabb of Harrd University for
assistance on this point.
20. According to Lawrence Stone, the conclusions of IV. R. Scott as to the decay of
trade at this time must still be considered valid. See Stone, State Control in Sixteenth-
Century England, 17 EcoN. Isr. REv. 103, 108 (1947).
21. J. Hi =-rR, THE REIGN OF KING PYit 77-84 (1941). Throughout chapter four, the
familial and financial ties of many important Puritans are explained.
22. C. BEDE., A BRmF HISTORy OF THE iIDDLE T.PLn 41.48 (1909).
23. The first part of the Institutes of the Laws of England was published in 1628, the
second in 1642, the third and fourth in 1644. [The parts of work are hereinafter dted as
1-4 INSr., to the pagination of the original editions.]
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between business and municipal corporations24 or between negotiable
instruments and promissory notes, 25 but this simply indicates that Coke
was no more modern in outlook than they. When legal historians speak
of Coke as a "transitional" figure attempting to adapt old common law
forms to modem needs, they are referring primarily to his treatment
of land tenure.
Those who go further do so on the basis of cases which Coke did not
decide.206 He has been credited, for example, with the decision in Slade's
Case27 which facilitated the enforcement of contracts. Until the mid-
sixteenth century, claims for liquidated damages had to be sued under
a writ of debt. The procedure hampered recovery, since it permitted a
wager of law28 and demanded greatly detailed pleading. Plaintiffs
much preferred the action of assumpsit, which was allowed by courts
only if the defendant had expressly promised to repay his debt. Slade's
Case held that the mere existence of a debt implied a promise to repay
and that this implication sufficed to ground an action in assumpsit.
The decision marked an advance in the adaptation of old common law
forms to commercial convenience. But Coke was not responsible for it.
In 1602 he was Attorney General, not Chief Justice of the King's Bench.
When appointed to the bench, Coke did have an opportunity further
to adapt the law to commercial changes. The courts were in great need
of general principles to help determine the validity of consideration
given to the defendant in cases arising from a writ of assumpsit. The
formulation of such principles would have avoided a series of narrow
or absurd decisions and aided the judicial enforcement of contracts,
But Coke accepted the existing analytical framework, deficient as it
was.29 At times, through his penchant for historic technicalities or
24. Williston, The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 3 SEL ar
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 195, 204 (1909).
25. Inland bills of exchange apparently were not in common use until at least the
1650's. Cranch, Promissory Notes Before and After Lord Holt, id. at 72, 79.
26. They assume that merely because Coke reported a case he helped arrive at its
decision. This must have been Fifoot's assumption when he credited Coke with the decision
in Slade's Case. See C. FIFOOT, TiE ENGLISH LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND (1932). But Coke
began taking notes on cases he heard argued from the time of his call to the bar (1578)
and began publishing them in 1600, long before lie was raised to the benc. Most of the
cases reported were decided by other justices. And although Coke elaborated upon the
decisions he reported, only at times did he indicate his approval by calling the reader's
attention to their importance either in his comments "To the Reader" or within the cases
themselves. The existence of such clear affirmation would seem to be essential, therefore,
when ascribing to Coke the views embodied in cases he did not decide. He may have
accepted the decisions in all cases as law, but this does not mean that he himself would
have arrived at the same conclusion.
27. 4 Co. Rep. 91, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602).
28. Thorne, supra note 15, at 19-20. If neighbors (usually twelve) swore on behalf of
the defendant, the plaintiff could not succeed.
29. On the need for formulating general principles see C. Firoor, supra note 26, at 160,
1326
Vol. 76: 1321, 1967
Coke's "Economic Liberalism"
through inadvertence,20 he even thwarted the needs of commerce. In
1612, for example, he still insisted that the validity of incorporations
depended upon the correct stipulation of name and place in the letters
patent.31
Indeed, the common law possessed no fund of commercial wisdom.
Commercial law was a distinct and separate body because medieval
merchants had demanded a more expeditious treatment of their prob-
lems than the common law courts provided. They used the staple
courts, courts of fairs and boroughs.3 2 After the decay of these courts
in the sixteenth century, they turned to the Admiralty and to other
courts of equity whose procedure was not burdened by rigid forms of
action and whose decisions were based on customary trade usages com-
piled in the law merchant.33 This provoked a reaction among defenders
of the common law and led to attempts to arrogate the jurisdiction of
the courts of equity. Competition with Chancery had brought about
the improvements in the action of assumpsit mentioned before.34 But
merchants seem to have thought these improvements in common law
forms insufficient. Both the Chancery and the Admiralty survived the
Civil Wars even though they were prerogative courts.
That they survived was due to no support from Coke, for he con-
tinued the earlier attempts to arrogate equity jurisdiction to the com-
mon law. His attacks on Chancery are notorious, but at least he enjoyed
the support of those who, like Selden, believed that "equity is a roguish
thing."35 When he persisted in attacking the Admiralty, however, Coke
stood alone. Not since 1575 had the common lawyers challenged this
court whose jurisdiction Queen Elizabeth had upheld in cases arising
upon the seas, in foreign ports and even at home if the dispute involved
denizen and foreign merchants.30 Coke deliberately misconstrued her
which seems to be the dearest account of early contract law. Coke's failure to think beyond
his contemporaries may be seen in Mallory v. Lane, Cro. Jac. 342, 79 Eng. Rep. 292. (Ex'c.
1614), and Theme v. Fuller, Cro. Jac. 396, 78 Eng. Rep. 338 (K.B. 1615).
30. Coke reported the dictum in Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 117, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P.
1602), in a manner that made it seem, on anything but the most careful reading, a rule of
law, thus enabling courts in the late nineteenth century and even now to insist that partial
payment of a debt was no consideration for a promise to forego the balance, but that the
offer of something different, however disproportionate in value, would suffice.
31. See Coke's report of The Case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 960(K.B. 1612).
32. 4 INsT. 0237; C. FI'OOT, supra note 26, at 104.
33. Burdick, Contributions of the Law Merchant to the Common Law, 3 Sarxcr EssAYs
IN ANcLO-AzxmEC.AN LEGAL HsroRa 34, 35-39 (1909).
34. Id. 41.
35. Quoted in Tudsbery, The Law Merchant and the Common Law, 24 L.Q. REV. 392,
400 (1918).
36. AV. PRYNNE, BRIEF A.UMADMVSIONS ON, A F.NDMNTS OF, AND ADDMONAL ..xPLA.%A-
TORY RECORDS To THE FOURTH PART OF THE INsTITUTES OF TtE LAWS OF E.NGA-;. CoVCMcN-
ING THE JURsICTION OF COURTS 99 (1669).
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settlement and in 1610 he sought to stay the Admiralty's proceedings.
He invented a transparent legal fiction to the effect that contracts be-
tween merchants, denizen and foreign, were made in the English port
regardless of where they were actually made,8 7 and then asserted com-
mon law jurisdiction over all cases involving merchants which arose
in England. The Fourth Part of his Institutes, published posthu-
mously, contained a bitter attack on the Admiralty."
This attack evoked equally bitter responses from spokesmen for the
mercantile interest.39 Godolphin, Zouch, and Prynne40 all defended
the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty. Support for this court was
so great that it was not until after the Restoration that the common
law obtained a monopoly of commercial litigation.41 At that time, the
common law courts were compelled to adopt the rules of the law
merchant for lack of any adequate precedent of their own.42 Nothing
necessitated this incorporation except jurisdictional rivalry. In the
long run merchants gained little; in the short run, they suffered great
inconveniences, inconveniences which did not at all trouble Sir Edward
Coke. He believed, no doubt, that politically the defence of the com-
mon law was in the interest of the merchants since they shared many
grievances against the Crown.43 Yet when the interests of the merchants
and the common law courts diverged, he favored the courts and with
no apparent hesitation.
II.
Coke resembled the Puritan merchants in neither his priorities nor
his interests and background. Nor did he share their alleged predilec-
tion for laissez-faire. In Commons he supported many statutes of
37. Id. 95-98
38. 4 INsT. *134-47.
39. For a detailed discussion of the Admiralty Court, see Brian Levack's unpublished
study, Department of History, Yale University.
40. See generally J. GODOPIMN, A VIEW OF THE ADMIRAL JURISDICTION (1661), R. Zoucir,
JUISDICTIoN or Tm An ama-AY (1669); and W. PRYNNE, supra note 36. In stressing the dis.
tinction between the law merchant and the common law and the need of merchants for
speedy, certain remedies, Prynne quoted Selden's Mare Clausum (The Right and Dominion
of the Sea), which appeared in 1618. W. PRYNNE, supra note 36, at 94-95. This is not to say
that the remedies afforded by the Admiralty were ideal. They were not, and occasional
complaints such as that of Sir Arthur Ingram could be heard. The point here is that the
Admiralty provided the best legal assistance to merchants available in seventeenth.century
England.
41. 5 W. Ho.DswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 143 (1924).
42. Tudsbery, supra note 35, at 398-400.
43. Coke also shared many grievances with the Puritans, grievances which were coinci-




"mercantilist" nature; on the bench he construed all such statutes in
accordance with the rules of his day. Coke's decisions may have been
narrow, but not because he sought deliberately to weaken judicial
enforcement of regulatory legislation. Unlike economic liberals, he
had no wish to dismantle the paternal structure of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. From Lord Burghley,4 4 Coke had acquired a
profound admiration for Tudor legislation, an admiration which sur-
vived even his break with the following (Stuart) Court.
That break occurred in 1621, shortly after the general election in
which Coke was returned to Parliament. 0 A serious trade crisis then
existed, so much of the debate concerned proposals to repair tie econ-
omy. Coke's advice was frequently sought, and he now was under no
constraint to endorse the official policy of regulation. Indeed, his per-
sonal pique at having been by-passed in the selection of a new Lord
Chancellor might easily have inspired an indiscriminate opposition to
any policy proposed by the King. Coke's political views had altered
markedly as a consequence of his new allegiance to Parliament. Whereas
he had previously accorded the Crown a wide range of discretionary
authority to regulate customs duties by proclamation 0 and to order
impositions,47 Coke now denied such prerogatives. But no new thoughts
on economic policy accompanied his redefinition of royal authority.
Coke conceded to Parliament those powers he denied to the Crown.
Certainly, his approach to foreign commerce was free of laissez-faire
44. C. READ, LORD BURGHLEY AND QUEEN EuLzAB~mi 586 n.26 (1950). Becatuse Lord
Burghley (William Cecil) was in some sense the architect of Tudor paternalism, his associa-
tion with Coke is of special importance.
45. Many historians date Coke's break from June 30, 1616 when he was sequestered from
the Council Table and forbidden to ride summer circuit as a Justice of Assize. AcTs OF
THE PiIVy COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, 1615-1616, at 649 (1925). In that year, he was called before
the Council to explain his Reports and on November 16 he was removed from his position
as Chief Justice of the King's Bench. Nevertheless, Coke himself seems not to have regarded
the events of 1616 as marking an irrevocable breach with James. He thought of nothing but
recovering himself from disgrace and immediately began making arrangements for the
marriage of his daughter to Sir John Villiers, the older brother of the Duke of Buckingham.
The marriage arranged, Coke was restored to the Privy Council on April 1, 1617. Acrs oF
THE Pmvy COUNCIL OF ENtGLAND, 1616-17, at 216 (1927). In 1621 he was listed as one of the
Privy Councillors in the House of Commons and when Parliament opened. James expected
him to cooperate with the Court Party. See D. WLLsoq, supra note 4, at 89. The final break
came in 1621, after the election and after Coke was by-passed in te selection of a new
Lord Chancellor.
46. 276 STATE PAERs DoMtEsTir, EIzABElTH, 1598-1601, at 521.
47. Coke supported the decision in Bate's Case in 1606, but said nothing to the effect
that the King's discretion was unconfined. 278 STATE PAPErs DO.arsnc, Cimu~rs 1, 1634, at
351. For another issue on which Coke altered his views, see 5 W. Howswormt. Hisrony OF
ENGL LAw 450 (1924), and note that this eminent historian believed that although Coke
departed from certain of his former political opinions, "his outlook was always that of a
statesman of the latter part of the Tudor period." Id. 456.
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notions.48 At the beginning of the session in 1621, Sir Edwin Sandys,
reporting for the Committee Concerning the Decay of Trade of which
he was chairman, listed scarcity of coin as the chief cause of the trade
depression.49 Coke agreed with his diagnosis and enumerated seven
reasons for the scarcity.50 Included in his analysis were the license of
the East India Company to transport bullion, the unfavorable balance
of trade, and the nature of the trade that was pursued. Displaying a
medieval attitude towards luxury, Coke complained that too much
commerce with France dealt in "wines and lace, and such like trifles."
Tobacco too, was considered a luxury and as Sandys noted,51 most of
England's trade with Spain was absorbed by the importation of tobacco.
Why not, he suggested, forbid the expenditure of so much money
abroad by compelling the purchase of tobacco from the colonies. As
a shareholder in the Virginia Company, Sandys naturally wished to
create a monopoly for that Company and also suggested that the growth
of tobacco in England be proscribed.52 Coke thought that the growing
of tobacco at home would help the farmers,5 3 but he did go along with
the proposal to forbid the import of Spanish tobacco.54
His greatest concern, however, was with England's staple commodity,
cloth. In the early part of the seventeenth century, the production of
finished cloth had declined and it was widely thought that this decline
was related to the practice of exporting unfinished cloth and importing
finished cloth. Since the reign of Edward III, the Crown had attempted
to eliminate this practice and to encourage the domestic industry by
prohibiting the import of all cloth. 5 Elizabeth too, sought to enforce
48. Coke's protectionist bias was revealed many more times than suggested above. He
requested, for example, stronger penalties against the export of iron and copper and
prayed that timber too might not be transported. 3 INsT. *97. The export of these metals,
necessary for England's defence and economic self-sufficiency, had previously been pro-
hibited. See Statute of Staples, 27 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1353); 33 Hen. 8, c. 7 (1541); 2 & 3 Edw.
6, c. 37 (1548). Thus, by upholding the existing statutes, Coke was upholding traditional
tenets of economic policy. And even when he appeared to endorse free trade, Coke invoked
very traditional arguments. On May 17, 1621, when a bill was introduced "to prohibit the
importation of corn," he opposed it saying: "If we bar the importation of corn when It
aboundeth, we shall not have it imported when we lack it. I never yet heard that a bill
was ever before preferred in Parliament against the importation of corn, and I love to fol-
low ancient precedents," 1 J. CANPrBELL, supra note 13, at 322. The export of corn had
been prohibited because Tudor statesmen wished to guarantee an adequate food supply at
home. To prohibit the import of corn would have endangered that supply so Coke opposed
the bill.
49. 1 PARLIAMENTARY HiSToRy 1196-97 (March 1, 1621).
50. Id. 1195 (Feb. 26, 1621).
51. Id. 1196 (Feb. 27, 1621).
52. 3 COMMONS DEBATES, 1621, at 8 (W. Notestein, F. Relf & H. Simpson eds. 1935).
53. Id.
54. 1 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 581 (April 18, 1621).
55. 11 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1337).
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this policy, but like her predecessors, she was compelled to abandon it
for want of adequate domestic dyeing and finishing skill. As an alterna-
tive policy, she set about encouraging the export of finished clothl0 and
extended the privileges of the great trading companies. The most im-
portant of these was the Merchant Adventurers Company, to which she
granted the exclusive right to export to Upper Germany and France as
well as to the Low Countries.57 Because of the concentration of its trade
in London, its exclusive admission policies, its high prices and its
practice of "cloth stretching," the Company became most unpopular.
Sir Edward decried these practices. 8 But above all, he objected to the
export of unfinished cloth. 9
In the hope of aiding the unemployed clothiers and of increasing
the revenue of the State by eliminating the need to import finished
cloth,60 Coke went so far as to embrace the ill-starred project of Alder-
man Cockayne, who found a new company to export only finished
cloth.61 The project ended in disaster, with other nations retaliating
by prohibiting the import of English cloth. By that time Coke had
withdrawn his support because of the nature of the Company.6 2 But he
persisted in his aim of encouraging home industry. In 1621, when the
Shrewsbury drapers' local monopoly of the Welsh cloth trade was
thrown open, Coke helped insure that their cloth had to be finished
before being sold.63 And in 1624, he advised that the export of wool be
made a felony.64 Sir Edward was not averse to the regulation of foreign
trade. He only insisted that Parliament do the regulating. 0
56. 8 Eiz. 1, c. 6 (1565).
57. C. LucAs, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH OvERSEAS ENTERPUSE 79 (1917). This was the
Charter of 1564.
58. A. Fis, supra note 17, at 244.
59. See Coke's memorandum of December 18, 1613 in Sir Julius Caesar's Notes from
the Privy Council Meetings Relating to Alderman Cockayne's Project, id., app. D, at 458.
Throughout his writings, Coke made many references to the virtue of encouraging home
industry either by prohibiting the import of clothes finished abroad or the export of
unfinished English cloth. 2 INsT. 041.
60. These were the same arguments used by Cockayne on behalf of his projcct. 3 E.
LipSoN, supra note 6, at 374-75.
61. Only three of James's Privy Councillors supported his decision to endorse the
project and the most enthusiastic among them was Coke. A Frs, supra note 17, at 26.
According to this account, Coke endorsed the project for opportunistic reasons and was
made a councillor as a token of James's gratitude. But Cokes position here was perfectly
consistent with the views he expressed after breaking with the Court and besides, Coke
withdrew his support of the project in January, 1616, when he was neither resigned nor
determined to lose favor.
62. Id. 467; 86 STATE PAPERS DO MSTIC, JAMES I, 1615-1616, at 358 (farch 27, 1616).
63. T. MENDENHALL, THE SHREWxSURY DRAPERS AND THE VELSH WOOL TRADz iN Tim XVI
AND XVII CENTmrus 176 (1953).
64. 1 JOURNALS OF THE HousE OF Coss'toNs 678 (March 6, 1623).
65. "That no Commodity can be banished, but by Act of Parliament." 1 JoInNAL OF aH
HousE OF COmmONs 581 (April 18, 1621). See also 3 INsr. *181-85.
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This constitutional issue of who was to do the regulating never arose
with regard to domestic trade: Tudor monarchs had judiciously re-
quested parliamentary sanction for their economic policies. They re-
ceived such sanction because of the consensus regarding the need to
maintain full employment, a proper wage and price structure, a suffi-
cient amount of land under tillage and fair trade practices. Tranquil-
lity, too, was an accepted goal of economic policy 0 because the Tudors
assumed a conflict among private interests and the need artificially to
maintain harmony.0 7 In the sixteenth century, England had only just
recovered from years of internecine strife and lacked the policy system
necessary to quell food and land riots. The enforcement agents were
informers, 8 Justices of the Peace and Councillors, whose inefficiency
made essential the prevention of unrest. Prevention and paternalism
went hand in hand with a multitude of regulations designed to remove
potential grievances. According to Tudor habits of thought, to chal-
lenge these regulations would be to challenge the entire underpinning
of the social fabric.
This is precisely what advocates of the laissez-faire thesis suggest Coke
hoped to do, a contention which must be examined in detail. Take,
for example, Coke's attitude toward the enclosure laws which pro-
hibited the conversion of farm land to pasturage. In 1607, he proceeded
against rioters who had tried to force down enclosures.0 9 But Coke
seems to have recognised the validity of the protest and, two years later,
led a commission "towards reforming depopulation, converting tillage
into pasturage, and preventing decay of husbandry." 70 At that time he
was still a Crown servant. Yet even in 1624 he believed that the Tudor
enactments which applied to the 25 midland counties most affected
by the conversion of land should remain in force.71 Enclosure by
agreement might be all right, provided it did not lead to depopula-
66. Fear of disorder helps to explain Star Chamber jurisdiction over semi-criminal
problems not covered by common law courts, e.g., prices, trade control and enclosures.
A. PoLLARD, WoLJsEY 77 (1929).
67. The body politic ideal so much admired in Coke's day ought properly to have led
to an assumption of harmony among private interests and also among private and public.
Yet as so often happens, the self-image of the Tudors was basically prescriptive. When It
came to legislating or pointing out wrongs, Coke and his contemporaries fully recognized
the gap between theory and practice and it was perhaps that recognition which allowed
for movement in a society whose ideal was static.
68. On the importance of informers see Beresford, The Common Informer, the Penal
Statutes and Economic Regulation, 10 ECON. HIsT. REv. (2d ser.) 221 (1957).
69. 28 STATE PAPERS DoMircs, JAms I, 1603-1610, at 373 (Sept. 1607).
70. Id. 541 (Sept. 2, 1609).
71. See 3 INsr. *204; Beresford, Habitation vs. Improvement: The Debate on Enclosure
by Agreement, in EssAYs ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF TUDOR AND STUART
ENGLAND 40-66 (F. Fisher ed. 1961).
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tion and did not involve the conversion to pasturage. "Agriculture or
Tillage," Coke wrote, "is of great account in Law, as being very profit-
able for the Commonwealth .. "72
So great was the fear of food shortage that the Tudors sought to en-
courage husbandry by artificially supporting the price of corn"3 as well
as by prohibiting the conversion of arable land. At the same time, they
frowned on individual attempts to raise prices for the sake of private
gain. Regulation was to be national and it was to provide for the
common good. The "Preamble" to a statute enacted in 1552 decried,
for example, the increase in the price of goods necessary for men's
subsistence due to the practices of those who minded "only their own
lure without respect of the Commonwealth, to the great damage, im-
poverishing and disquieting of his majesty's subjects."7 4 That was the
"Preamble" to the great declaratory act against forestalling and the
related offences of regrating and engrossing: the purchase of merchan-
dise, victuals and other commodities on their way to market for the
purpose of restricting supply, the reselling of commodities brought to
and purchased in the same market at a higher price, and the purchase
of corn or grain, butter or cheese, fish or other dead victuals with the
intent of reselling. Statutes prohibiting these crimes, as they were
considered, date back to the thirteenth century and were passed peri-
odically until late in the eighteenth." Usually, they were enacted in
72. 1 INsr. *85b. Coke's concern for tillage and also tenurial rights probably explains
why he reported Tyrringham's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 36b, 16 Eng. Rep. 973 (KLB. 158.1). so favor-
ably. The plaintiff in the case was a farmer of a landlord in Northamptonshire who had
purchased a house, land and part of the meadow and commons belonging to a neighbor-
ing estate. Prior to the sale, that part of the commons had been used by the tenant of the
original landlord for pasturage, but the new landlord forbade the tenant to graze his
cattle. When the tenant chased out the cattle of the new landlord's farmer, the farmer
brought an action for trespass. The case was very complicated because the defendant needed
pasture land to graze the cattle he used to till his land. The question confronting the
King's Bench, therefore, was whether as a condition of his socage tenure, the pasturage was
appurtenant to his husbandry. A long dictum followed the court's decision in favour of
the defendant as to the benefit of maintaining land in tillage. In the court's words, or
better, in Coke's, "the common law prefers arable land before all other." If the defendant
were forbidden to use the commons, he would be forced to convert land now," used for
tillage into pasture. Parliament had made excellent statutes to keep up the price of corn
and thereby to encourage husbandry, but these would be ineffectual if men were compelled
to convert arable land. It is reasonable to attribute these views to Coke even though lie did
not decide the case, because in his "Comment to the Reader" Coke explained how: im-
portant and wise a decision he thought it was and obviously interpolated his own policy
considerations within the text of his report.
73. See note 72 supra. For an opposite view of Tudor policy see Letwin, The English
Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHi. L. RE%,. 355, 367-68 (1954), where Letvin
suggests that low prices were the object of laws against forestalling and engrossing. What he
seems to forget is that these became statutory offenses in times of scarcity when prices
were already high and the object was to prevent famine and profiteering.
74. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 14 (1552).
75. In 1772, the statute of Edward VI was repealed by 12 Geo. 3, C. 71, but badgers,
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times of great scarcity76 and then remained in force after the immediate
crisis. The offenses they defined were already indictable at common
law, but the statutes also assigned punishments to be enforced by the
courts.
Coke's first experience with the statutes against forestalling and
engrossing seems to have come in 1598, when he was Attorney General.
In that year, he attended a conference of all the justices, who decided
that any "merchant, subject, or stranger, bringing victuals or merchan-
dize into this realme, may sell them in grosse: but that vendee cannot
sell them againe in grosse, for then he is an ingrosser. . . and may be
indicted thereof at the common law, as for an offence that is malum
in se." 77 At first appearance, Coke and the justices were making an
exception for foreign traders and restricting the purview of the Statute
of 1552. Yet that Statute specifically excluded persons transporting
"things imported from beyond the seas," and this exception was upheld
by 13 Eliz. 1, c.25. Parliament had recognised that the initial sale by
importers could be in gross and sought only to proscribe intermediate
sales among middlemen.
If Parliament's intent was clear on this question, it was not too
obvious which items were to be subsumed under the general category
of "victuals." Certain commodities such as corn were mentioned specifi-
cally, but the statute of 1552 made no attempt to enumerate all "vict-
uals." Instead it was left to the courts to determine. Their guideline
was the "Preamble" to the statute, which stressed goods necessary for
subsistence. Salt clearly fell into that category,7 8 but fruit did not. At
least that is what Coke and the other justices resolved in Baron v. Boys.79
The Exchequer had already excepted fruit,80 so Coke and his colleagues
were in no way departing from precedent. Nor were they revealing an
"aversion" to the statute. Coke himself tried at least four cases in-
volving forestallers and engrossers. One he dismissed on technical
engrossers, forestallers and regrators remained indictable at common law. Only In 1844
with the enactment of 7 9- 8 Vict., c. 24, were the offenses of forestalling, regrating and
engrossing entirely abolished. W. SANDERSON, REsTRAINT OF TRADE IN ENGLISH LAW 97-98(1926).
76. For a good summary of the laws against forestalling, see Jones, Historical Develop.
ment of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905, 906-20 (1926).
77. 3 INsr 196. An offence that was malum in se was against the law of nature or the
law of God and thus even the King could not dispense with a statute proscribing such an
evil. Birdsall, Non Obstante-A Study of the Dispensing Power of Enghsh Kings, in ESSAYS
IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLEs HOWARD MCILWAIN 56 (1936).
78. 3 INsT. *195-96.
79. 13 Co. Rep. 18, 77 Eng. Rep. 1429 (Ex. 1608).
80. Braddon v. Bowen, Cro. Jac. 214, 79 Eng. Rep. 187 (Ex. 1608).
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grounds,81 the other three he decided against the defendants 8 2 In the
Third Part of his Institutesss Coke devoted a chapter to explaining the
laws and seems fully to have approved of them.
Coke appears to have been similarly sympathetic to the single most
extensive regulatory enactment of the period. Passed in 1563, the
Statute of Artificers 4 regulated entrance into given trades, provided
full employment to craftsmen, and guaranteed the quality of the skill.
It sought to "banish idleness, advance husbandry, and yield unto the
hired person, both in time of scarcity, and in the time of plenty, a
convenient proportion of wages."815 Justices of the Peace were empow-
ered to fix wages and for the first time a national apprenticeship re-
quirement was imposed.86 Regulations were so detailed that any one at
all inclined toward "free trade" would have found them intolerable.
But Coke fully endorsed the Statute of Artificers. As Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas, he was expected to deliver a charge to the
assizes at the beginning of each term of the law courts and to draw up
a list of articles for presentment. Whether his list differed from his
predecessor's is difficult to say. 7 But at Norwich he asked that the
constables of each hundred see that "All masters be presented that...
give greater wages than shall be set down by the justices of the peace"
and that they "inquire into and present masters who turn away
servants before the time for which retained, for that thereby many
become rogues and idle persons."88 That was in 1607. In the 1630's.
he still believed that the many statutes made for the "punishment of
riots, unlawful assemblies,.., excessive taking of wages contrary to the
81. King & Goldesborow v. Wlhider, 2 Bulst. 317, 80 Eng. Rep. 1152 (ILB. 1614). For the
difficulty common informers encountered in trying to produce admissible evidence, See
Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L REv. 759, 763 n.13
(1955).
82. Suckerman & Coates v. Warner, 2 Bulst. 248, 80 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B. 1614); R. v.
Davies, 1 Rolle 11, 81 Eng. Rep. 291 (K.B. 1614); R. v. Wray, 1 Rolle 194, 81 Eng. Rep. 426
(L-B. 1615). See generally W. ILLINGWORTH, AN INQuiRY ,Nro THE LAw's, ANctEr Ao Mon-
ERN, RESPEcrING FORESTALLING, REGRATING AND INGROSSING (1800).
83. 3 INsr. 0194-97.
84. 5 Fiz.1, c. 4 (1562).
85. Id., preamble.
86. The apprenticeship clauses were not part of the original bill; they were added
through the initiative of the Commons. For new insight into the formulation of the Statute
see S. Bin oFF, THE M.AKIrG or THE STATUTE oF ARTI cIc.s, ELzAnrHAN Gov .zisMtr AND
SociEr, especially at 68-79 (1961). Until 1563 apprenticeship regulation had been left to
gild towns, whose assistance in enforcing the new statute was still required by the admin-
istrative weaknesses of the Tudor state. But the Statute of Artificers did mark a decisive
step towards national uniformity and control, and indeed most of Coke's criticism of gilds
was directed against ordinances which were either more stringent than the new Statute or
which conificted with other of the newly formulated national policies.
87. M. DAVIFS, THE ENFOno mENT OF ENsLISH ApPRENmcrsw, 1563-1642, at 232 (1956).
88. THE LoRD CoKE, His SPcu AND CHARE (1607); 276 STATE PArPas Do.xtmmc, ELuZ-
BEru, 1598-1601, at 519.
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statutes of labourers and artificers" were "good statutes" whose lack of
enforcement was to the "great let of the common law, and wealth of
this land ....- 89
Coke's performance on the bench, however, is more controversial.
Prior to the Restoration, there were very few cases in which the ques-
tion of apprenticeship even arose. Coke decided two of them while
Chief Justice of the King's Bench. The more famous was The Taylors
of Ipswich Case0 which involved the relationship between a gild
ordinance and the Statute of Artificers. The Merchant Taylors had
required that their permission be obtained to exercise a trade after
the prospective craftsmen had completed their apprenticeship. The
defendant, a private tailor to a "freeman of Ipswich," refused to clear
with the society, which then brought suit. Coke found that the Statute
did not apply to domestic servants, but this was no more than a dictum.
The defendant had in fact been properly apprenticed. Coke never
addressed himself to the validity of the apprenticeship regulations be-
cause the point in issue was whether or not the Merchant Taylors might
compel fully apprenticed craftsmen to obtain their permission to prac-
tice their trade. The Taylors' charter granted them the right to pass by-
laws so that the question was the validity of the particular ordinance. 1
Coke decided that it was not valid because the Merchant Taylors'
ordinance tended to create a monopoly and violated the "liberty and
freedom of the subject." This was after The Case of Monopolies 2 had
been decided, and Coke had the solid weight of precedent behind him.
Citing this case, he explained that the law forbade no man to exercise
the trade for which he was qualified. Idleness was abhorred by the law
because it was "the mother of all evil,... and especially in young men,
who ought in their youth . . . to learn lawful sciences and trades,
which are profitable to the Commonwealth. 093 What Coke objected to
was not the statute but the possibility that a man qualified to work
89. 4 INsT. *40.
90. 11 Co. Rep. 55, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614).
91. The "new monarchy" had asserted itself over chartered towns and other corporate
bodies; The Ordinances of Corporations Act, 19 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1503), bestowed on judges the
power to abrogate new gild ordinances made without their consent. See W. CUNNINGIIAM,
THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 26 n.2 (1907). Most accounts fail to dis-
tinguish between Coke's censure of a particular ordinance and an institution itself. To
censure the former may have signified a weakening of the power of corporate bodies but
it was perfectly consistent with contemporary practice as suggested by the statute men-
tioned above. Significantly, Coke did not challenge the charters of properly incorporated
bodies and generally reflected the Tudors' ambivalent attitude-their desire for national
control but recognition of administrative problems which still gave great importance to
pluralist groups.
92. 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
93. 11 Co. Rep. at 53b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1219.
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under the act might be prevented from doing so by a gild. Even Heck-
scher recognized the weakness of basing his estimate of Coke as a free
trader on this case, and relied on Coke's narrow construction in the
second of the two cases he decided.
That was Tooley's (or Tolley's) Case9 in which the defendant, a
Londoner, had taken up the work of an upholsterer after serving his
apprenticeship as a wool packer. He was prosecuted by the Crown
because the Statute of Artificers provided that a man must be ap-
prenticed to the specific trade he practiced. The statute had not,
however, enumerated the trades which came under its scope. Each
section covered different trades and the section on apprenticeship was
very vague: "None shall set up, occupy, use or exercise any craft,
mystery or occupation, now used or occupied within the realm of
England or Wales; except he shall have been brought up therein seven
years at least as an apprentice."0 5 In a dictum, Coke said the provision
did not cover upholstering because it was neither a "trade nor a mystery
and did not require any skill."
According to Heckscher, 9 this was the first time the courts had ever
excluded a craft: Coke was using immoderate discretion to narrow the
scope of the statute because he had an "aversion" to apprenticeship
regulation. This interpretation would seem to be incorrect. The occu-
pation of buying and selling had been excluded twice in different
decisions.97 More important, it had been excluded on the ground that
it required no special skill, precisely the ground on which Coke ex-
cluded upholstering. He and the other justices 8 considered the main-
tenance of a certain standard of skill among craftsmen the basis for the
apprenticeship rule; hence employments requiring no training seemed
outside the scope of the Statute.
94. 2 Bulst. 186, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B. 1613).
95. 5 Eliz. 1, c. 4, § 31 (1562).
96. 1 E. Hsr~uscim, MRcATsm 292 (M. Shapiro trans. 1935).
97. In 1580 judgment was given in the Exchequer upon an information against a cloth.
ier, that the statutory "exercismg a trade" was not applicable to the bu)ing of unfinished
cloth and its later sale by the buyer after being put out for finishing. In 1600 the occupation
of costermonger was said to be exempt. These decisions are cited in M. DAvIEs, Tm Ex.c-
FoRcmheNt OF ENGL!Sn APPRENCESHnP 241 (1956). Generally, the judicial interpretation of
the Statute was far from being so uniformly unfavorable as has been supposed. Deny, The
Enforcement of a Seven Years' Apprenticeship under the Statute of Artificers, in 4 An-
s-RAcTs OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF P1wOSOPHY FOR THE UNnIVESITY OF
OxFoRD 10-11 (1931). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Statute was still enforced
at the end of the seventeenth century. Letwin, supra note 73. at 3S4-65.
98. And also other commentators on the statute. For although section x.xiv explicitly
mentioned manual occupations, within ten years after the statute passed, an unsigned
"Memorandum" ascribed the apprenticeship regulation to the need to maintain skill as
well as the need to restrict the number of artificers. The "Memorandum" is published in
1 TuDoR EcoNoMuc DocuMmms 353-63 (R. H. Tawney & E. Power eds. 1924).
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Even if Heckscher were correct and Coke was the first to construe a
trade as being outside the statute, it would not at all follow that he
opposed apprenticeship regulation. As Thorne has shown, the six-
teenth century witnessed a general trend towards curtailment of judi-
cial supplementation of statutes which had nothing to do with eco-
nomic policy.90 As the number and importance of statutory enactments
increased, so too did the narrowness with which the courts interpreted
the words of Parliament. A more modern awareness of legislative
competence was leading the courts to restrict their discretion and apply
the intention of the legislature. In the Statute of Artificers, as in the
Statute against Forestallers, Parliament's intention was stated in gen-
eral terms and it was up to the courts to determine which trades fell
within their scope. A negative decision with regard to a particular
trade need not, therefore, imply any bias.
Coke's central concern in Tooley's Case was neither laissez-faire nor
the unskilled nature of the upholstering trade. The issue of skill arose
because it was in the indictment and because it constituted one of the
arguments of the defense counsel. But the gravamen of the argument
was the privilege of London. 00 The statute had stipulated that a man
must be apprenticed to the specific trade he practiced. The custom of
London pernitted freemen who had been apprenticed to any trade to
practice any other. London was an incorporated city, the validity of
whose customs had been recognised by royal charter and confirmed
by Parliament. Section 33 of the statute explicitly excluded the City
from its scope. Coke found for Tooley because he was a Londoner, and
not because Coke had an "aversion" to the statute.
III.
On the basis of his attitude towards the three most important Tudor
regulations, it can hardly be said that Coke departed from contempo-
rary legal and economic opinion. He supported paternalistic measures,
99. See his brilliant Introduction to T. Egerton, A DiscouasF UPON Tim ExrOsiciON &
UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTrrs (Thorne ed. 1942). Holdsworth explains that in the Tudor.
Stuart period, dismissals of prosecutions of all types of cases for seemingly minor inaccu.
racies in the indictment were frequent. 4 W. HoLDsWorTH, HisroRy OF ENGLIS1H LW 531
(1924).
100. Unlike civilian lawyers who opposed municipal corporations on the ground that
they impugned the sovereignty of the state, Coke and the common lawyers usually defended
the privileges of the City and other incorporated towns. See 2 INsT. *20; The Chamberlain
of London's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 62b, 79 Eng. Rep. 150 (K.B. 1590); Clearywork v. Constable,
Cro. Eliz. 110, 78 Eng. Rep. 367 (K.B. 1588); Waggoner v. Fish, 2 Brownl. & Golds. 284, 123
Eng. Rep. 944 (C.P. 1610) (also reported as The Case of the City of London, 8 Co. Rep,
121b, 77 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1610)).
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using his judicial authority to uphold their provisions and purposes.
Advocates of the laissez-faire thesis were quite mistaken in suggesting a
deliberate attempt to weaken enforcement of statutory regulations.
And they were also mistaken in suggesting a deliberate distortion of
precedent when dealing with cases of monopoly. According to Wag-
ner,10 1 Sir Edward undermined a tolerance of restrictive practices long
established at common law; his economic liberalism led him to intro-
duce novel anti-monopoly notions into his decisions. But Coke dealt
fairly with precedent and insofar as he made any contribution to the
legal underpinnings of capitalism, it was to modify the blanket pro-
scription of all contracts in restraint of trade.
Since the fifteenth century, courts had refused to enforce contracts
in which one party promised not to practice his trade.1 2 In Colgate v.
Bacheler, which was decided two years before The Case of Monopolies,
the King's Bench still found that "to prohibit or restrain any to use a
lawful trade at any time, or at any place" is against public policy and
unenforceable. 03 Coke was the first to modify this doctrine and he did
so in Rogers v. Parrey.10 4 The case involved the validity of a promise
made by the defendant to the effect that in consideration of so much
paid to him by the plaintiff, he would not exercise his trade as joiner in
London for twenty-one years. The defendant had not abided by his
promise and was being sued. Coke found for the plaintiff, thus uphold-
ing a contract made in restraint of trade.
Proponents of the laissez-faire thesis could have used the decision in
Rogers v. Parrey to their advantage, 05 for the sanctity of contract and
right to eliminate competition through voluntary agreement were vital
aids in the growth of modem capitalism. Courts in the nineteenth cen-
101. See note 9 supra.
102. R. wiLBErPoRcE, A. CAmmELL & N. ErT, ThE LAw oF REsmcr TAoE PRAc.
TcES AND MONOPOLIES 39-55 and passim (1957) [hereinafter cited as W-nnroncE].
103. Cro. Eliz. 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (K.B. 1601).
104. 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613). The more decisive departure from
precedent, however, was Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1619).
105. But only to a certain extent-because Coke actually decided the case on the narrow
basis of contract law, finding for the plaintiff on the sole ground that the consideration he
had offered the defendant was sufficient. In the important conflicting precedent, Dyer's
Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, 5B (1414), the defendant's bond that he would not practice his
trade was not enforced. But there was no consideration at all for Dyeres bond, and later
cases and commentators have argued that the case is simply part of the early evolution of
the doctrine of consideration. Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch.
1711) (Lord Macclesfield); Letwin, supra note 73, at 373-74. Besides, insofar as the case
raised questions of policy, Coke agreed that a man cannot bind himself not to use his trade
generally as Dyer had done for that would deprive him of his livelihood. The only reason-
able restraint he might voluntarily accept was not to exercise his trade for "a time certain,
and in a place certain," Rogers v. Parrey, 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1013 (K.B. 1613).
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tury'06 used Coke's reasoning to uphold contracts more restrictive than
that in Rogers v. Parrey. Yet the decision was ignored by Wagner who
wanted to demonstrate the radical implications of Coke's attack on
monopolies and not Coke's contribution to the growth of modern trusts.
That Coke did attack some107 monopolies is certain. Whether his
attack necessarily represented a departure from precedent or whether
the common law had an inherent bias against trade restraint has aroused
great controversy. In the seventeenth century, "monopoly" meant both
private acts of hoarding and exclusive trade privileges bestowed by the
Crown. 08 No precise precedent existed for the second of these forms
because it was not until 1601 that royal patents became actionable at
common law. 09 Cases involving the Crown prerogative had previously
come before the Star Chamber and Privy Council; only the popular
and parliamentary outcry induced Elizabeth to concede common law
jurisdiction. Private monopolies, however, had long been voidl"o and
centuries of case-law could be applied to royal monopolies. So too,
could the broad policy of full employment: royal privileges were ex-
clusive and prevented craftsmen in monopolized trades from working.
Most important, Coke and other litigants could cite evidence of long-
standing government antipathy to restrictive gild practices. Gild ordi-
nances which fixed prices at extortionate levels or lowered quality or
excluded an unreasonable proportion of applicants had nearly always
been unlawful."'
106. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711); Maxim.
Nordenfelt Ammunition Co. v. Nordenfelt, [1894] A.C. 535.
107. For the very limited nature of Coke's attack, see pp. 1351-58 infra.
108. 6 OxroRD ENGLISH DIrIONARY 624 (1933).
109. See Elizabeth's "Golden Speech," delivered on November 20, 1601, in Price, supra
note 5, app. K. Wagner thought the absence of precise precedent indicated previous com-
mon law acquiescence in monopolies and therefore deduced a departure in policy from The
Case of Mlonopolies.
110. See p. 1345 infra.
111. For complaints against restrictive gild practices, see Jones, Historical Development
of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 906, 922-30 (1926), and Kellet, The Break.
down of Gild and Corporation Control over the Handicraft and Retail Trade in London,
10 ECON. Hxrr. REv. (2d Ser.) 381-83 (1958).
William L. Letwin, perhaps the ablest proponent of the view that the common law ef-
fected a volte face in order to void trade restraints in the seventeenth century, cited only
one example of prior acquiescence in "unfree" trade: The Case of the Archbishop of York,
in which a court upheld the custom of the Archbishop's manor at Ripon that no one
should operate a dyeing house there without the Archbishop's license. See Letwin, supra
note 73, at 373. But this case involved rights attached to a manor bestowed by the King and
to have decided otherwise would have meant challenging the Crown's prerogative and the
Archbishop's privilege. Thus the decision testifies more to the state of political opinion In
medieval England and to the power of the Church than to the common law attitude to-
wards trade restriction.
In fact, by the fourteenth century, English courts were already invalidating gild ordi-
nances, apparently on the basis of early statutes. Examples of early decisions against par-
ticular gild ordinances may be found in Jones, supra, at 928. Statutes prohibiting agree-
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Decisions involving gild restraints provided excellent precedent by
which to void monopolies, even though the common law had never
been granted jurisdiction over actual charters."- The problem was
the paucity of such decisions: the privilege of judging ordinances had
been conceded only recently 13 and litigation never really arose until
after the gilds had declined and after they had resorted to practices
which were a travesty of their purpose." 4 This was in the very late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when there was a spate of
cases. The most important, Davenant v. Hurdis,"0 concerned the valid-
ity of a by-law which required members of the Merchant Taylors to
employ cloth-making bretheren on at least half their cloth or pay a
forfeit. The plaintiff, Davenant, had refused to comply with the by-law
and when distrained for the forfeit brought an action in trespass. Sir
Edward was his counsel; Francis Moore'10 represented the Company.
Coke's basic claim was that the by-law tended to create a monopoly.
If members could be compelled to employ cloth-making brethren on
half their cloth, then eventually they might be required to employ
ments to fix the terms of employment go back as far as 1300. WiL EnRoRcE, supra note 102,
at 65. But not even Coke claimed these statutes were declaratory of the common law. R.
WRIGHT, THE LAiw OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES AND AGRE-mmENs 40 (1891). There werc, of
course, cases in which gild privileges were upheld. But these were tried in the prerogative
courts. H. Fox, MoNoPoLI.s AND PATEN-TS 21 n.6 (1949).
In dealing with gild restrictions, Coke and his contemporaries could not invoke the doc-
trine of conspiracy in restraint of trade because until 1721 combinations of workers to raise
wages or otherwise to alter the conditions of employment were not held to be criminal con-
spiraces at common law. Bryan, The Deelopment of the English Law of Conspiracy, 27
JoHNs Hoprms UNvEsrry STmIEs iN HisromcAL AND PoLrr iL SCcCE 257-58 (1909).
112. That is, no court could invalidate a gild charter in the same way the court voided
an industrial patent in 1603, and no exact precedent existed because of limited com-
mon law jurisdiction over institutions having royal sanction.
113. See note 91 supra as to when even the ordinances become actionable at common
law.
114. Gilds were originally meant to regulate trade whereas in their decline the)y resorted
to restrictive practices. The distinction between regulation and restriction may seem un-
sound and imprecise today but it had a very real meaning in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. It was the difference between setting just as opposed to extortionate prices; be-
tween enforcing standards of quality as opposed to adulterating goods. And mast important,
it was the difference between harmonious government in a trade and acrimonious diLsn-
sion caused by the exclusion of many who sought membership and training in the craft of
their choice.
115. Moore 576, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1598). Coke did not report this case except
within the context of his discussion of monopolies in The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep.
84, 86, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (K.B. 1602), and 2 INsT. 048.
Other cases were Norris v. Staps, Hobart 210, 80 Eng. Rep. 357 (K.B. 1616), and
The Tailors of Ipswich Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (LB. 1614). See also Kelict,
supra note 111, at 381-95.
116. That Frands Moore represented the Merchant Tailors notwithstanding his oppsi-
tion to monopolies in the Parliament of 1597 suggests the apolitical nature of the adversary
system even in the sixteenth century. Coke was then Attorney General but seems to have
argued the case in a private capacity. The fact of his defence of Davenant in itself proves
nothing of his attitude towards monopolies. But the arguments he used in 1599 were pre-
cisely those later used by Coke's adversary in The Case of Monopolies.
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brethren on all of it. Other members would then be put at the mercy
of the cloth workers of the Company and cloth workers outside would
be put out of work and compelled to subsist on relief. To deprive a
skilled craftsman of the right to practice his trade, Coke said, was to
deprive him of the "liberty of the subject."'117 In support of his argu-
ment, he cited a dictate from the civil law," 8 and a number of cases in
which by-laws or patents had been held valid because they were for the
public good:
a regulation that all ships must harbor in one port and no other,
a grant by the King giving a skilled foreigner the sole right to
make sailing canvas, and another giving a skilled projector ex-
clusive right to drain lands, a by-law that all cloth sold in London
must first be inspected and passed at Blackwell Hall, a by-law of
St. Albans requiring each inhabitant to pay a contribution toward
cleaning the town, and by-laws for the maintenance of bridges,
walls, and similar public works." 9
According to Wagner, 120 Coke's argument was weak and the King's
Bench accepted it only because Chief Justice Popham was himself
opposed to monopolies and because Francis Moore, counsel for the
defendant, conceded that the ordinance of the Merchant Taylors would
be void if it did in fact create a monopoly. But their unanimous refusal
to defend a monopoly suggests a consensus about the prior state of
the law. And if Coke had anticipated serious resistance to his argu-
ment, he might have cited the few early decisions against gild restric-
tions. Instead, he counterposed regulations made in the public interest
with the ordinance of the Merchant Taylors. The cases which he
cited' 21 affirmed the right of municipal corporations to make laws
which carried out local customs provided they were consonant with
law and reason. 22 The test of reason was the public interest, which in
Davenant v. Hurdis Coke construed to mean full employment of
skilled craftsmen. This definition, being perfectly consistent with
Tudor policy and with the prevailing view of employment as one of
the inherent rights of Englishmen,123 did not require elaboration.
117. The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 86b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (K.B. 1602).
118. Moore at 580, 72 Eng. Rep. at 771.
119. Letivin, supra note 73, at 261.
120. Wagner, The Common Law and Free Enterprise: An Early Case of Monopoly, 7
EcoN. Hisr. REv. 217, 218 (1937).
121. The last three by-laws cited by Coke (see text accompanying note 119 supra) were
upheld in these cases respectively: The Chamberlain of London's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 62b, 77
Eng. Rep. 150 (K.B. 1590); Clark's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (C.P. 1595); and
Jeffrey's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 66b, 77 Eng. Rep. 155 (C.P. 1590).
122. See The Case of the City of London, 8 Co. Rep. 121b, 77 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1609).
123. M. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONsTrruboN 37 (1949).
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Nevertheless, it received elaboration four years later when the King's
Bench for the first time tried and voided royal patents. The Case of
Monopolies'24 arose on an action brought by Edward Darcy against
T. Allen for infringing his privilege to make, importm and sell play-
ing cards. The patent had been granted in August of 1598 and there-
after the plaintiff, a Groom of the Privy Council, had had difficulty
enforcing it.121 The Council does not seem to have been able to help
him, so that when Elizabeth opened her patents to the scrutiny of the
common law, he immediately took advantage of the opportunity to
prosecute. The litigation was carried on until Easter term, 1603, when
the decision was handed down.
Virtually every account credits Coke with that decision. But in 1603
Coke was Solicitor General and, like the other legal officer of the
Crown, the Attorney General, he was obliged to defend the contested
patent. The decision in The Case of Monopolies was not Coke's own
and even if it were it would in no way demonstrate his distortion of
precedent.
According to Coke's report,1' -7 the King's Bench cited Davenant v.
Hurdis and general statements of principle to void monopolies-state-
ments from Fortescue,128 the Bible,2O and a decision in the reign of
Henry IV to the effect that royal grants must not burden the subject.' 0
The decision in The Case of Monopolies, however, rested principally
on an appeal to traditional values and public policy of the common
law. The court held that all trades furnishing employment to subjects,
124. 11 Co. Rep. 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (ILB. 1602); Darcy v. Allen, Moore 672, 72 Eng.
Rep. 830 (K.B. 1602).
125. Darcy had been granted two distinct patents: one for the exclusive sale and pro.
duction of playing cards, and one for the exclusive right to import such cards. The court's
opposition to the latter was to the use of the royal dispensing power to nullify acts of Par-
liament and is not referred to in this discussion.
126. For the repeated complaints made by Darcy, see 31 Acts oF Tim Pzuvv CouNcir.,
1600-1601 (n.s.), 55-56 (1906), and 32 Acrs oF THE Pimur CouNciL, 1601-1604 (ns.) 132-33,
237, 501 (1907).
127. Coke reported The Case of Monopolies twelve years after it was decided. In his
discussion, he made it very dear that he supported the decision for the defendant by calling
the readers' attention to the "glorious preamble and pretence of this odious monopoly."
11 Co. Rep. 84b, 88b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (K.B. 1602).
128. Wagner observed that Coke's references to chapter 26 of Fortescue's De Laudibus
Legum Angliae was incorrect, but that in chapter 85 of his Third Inslitutes, Coke cor-
rectly cited chapters 55 and 36. The second of these chapters urged that every inhabitant
"is at his full liberty to use and enjoy whatever his farm produceth." Wagner, Cohe and
the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 EcoN. Ham. REv. 36 n.1 (1935).
129. "No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to pledge: for he taketh a
man's life to pledge." Deut. 24:6. Coke concluded that scripture showed that "a man's trade
is accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; and therefore the monopolist that
taketh away a man's trade, taketh away his life and therefore is so much the more odious
." 3 INST. *181.
130. The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 86, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1262 (K.B. 1602).
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thus preventing idleness, were of value to the Commonwealth and an
exclusive grant to exercise such a trade was against the liberty and
benefit of the subject; that monopolies were not only prejudicial to the
traders excluded but also to the public generally because of their three
inseparable incidents: the raising of prices, the deterioration of quality
of the goods and the impoverishment of excluded trades.
Technically, the law in question was statutory. But most of the
statutes cited were declaratory of the common law. In Coke's words,
"admission and allowance of the justices ought to be holden for law."10'
Difficulties arose when the courts had long decided a matter in one way
and Parliament then legislated in another.132 But the problem did not
arise here and no one challenged the validity of statutory citations.
One of the more important was the Statute of Labourers, 25 Edw.
3 (1350). It had been enacted because the shortage of labor created by
the Black Death put great inflationary pressure on wages and King
Edward wished to restore them to their original level. But in addition
to fixing wages, the statute compelled all those "able in body and under
the age of sixty" to work. Like the Statute of Artificers which Coke
also reported, it sought to enforce full employment. Both of these enact-
ments imposed an obligation to work, and it would seem that the
"libertye" or right to work upheld by Davenant v. Hurdis and The
Case of Monopolies actually derives from this obligation. If public
policy required that all be usefully employed, then certain privileged
individuals could not be permitted to deprive others of their trade.
The statutes created the obligation; the courts upheld the right. Mo-
nopolies led to unemployment and were therefore void at common law.
Monopolies also raised prices arbitrarily. Apart from the new politi-
cal problem of royal sanction, many laws forbade private attempts to
manipulate the market. Coke could draw upon 27 Edw. 3, c. 11 and
later acts which prohibited the forestalling of wine and other victuals
or wares. Cases involving the infringement of these statutes came
before the Star Chamber and the Council. But as the statutes were
declaratory, local courts helped to enforce them and so did the courts
of common law.133 A case reported in one of the books of Assize, for
131. 2 INsT. *399 and the table on "laws" following.
132. In the 1620's, Coke fully acknowledged the competence of Parliament to legislate
contrary to the common law. See, e.g., 4 INsr. *14. But he warned that statutes which flew
in the face of custom would not last very long. 4 INsT. '31.
133. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 377 (1922). Coke cited to the reign of
Edward III very frequently because it was then that the first real efforts at national reg-
ulation were made and because the statutes of that reign bore a marked resemblance to
those of Elizabeth's. Moreover, Coke wanted precedents from as far back in time as pos-
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example, spoke of a Lombard indicted in London for various offences,
including "practicing by words to enhance the price of merchan-
dise."'134 It was argued on his behalf that, as his words had not had the
intended effect and no damage had been done, he had committed no
offence. His plea was overruled, however. As in The Case of Monopo-
lies, the court sought no actual evidence of the inseparable incidents to
forestalling or monopolies.135
The application of the statutes against forestalling and engrossing
had always been narrow. But Coke might have noted any number of
cases on behalf of the common law's bias against attempts by individuals
to manipulate prices. That he did not do so suggests that Coke (and the
court whose decision he was reporting) assumed the parallel between
the offenses of engrossing and forestalling and monopolies would be
obvious to his contemporaries. It was obvious to a complainant in
1587136 and also to Coke's arch-enemy, Bacon, who wrote: "Monopoly
and engrossing differ only in this, that the first is by patent from the
King, the other by act of the subject, between party and party; but
both are equally injurious to trade and the freedom of the subject,
and therefore equally restrained by the common law."1 37
Thus by citing the offences of forestalling and engrossing Coke was
appealing to trade restraints generally recognized as analogous to royal
monopolies. So far from distorting precedent or arbitrarily imposing
his own views, Coke drew upon the common law bias against indi-
vidual forms of trade intervention and applied it to exclusive privileges
conferred by the Crown. His logic was valid; his citations apposite.
Anything "liberal" in his opposition to monopolies had likewise been
present in ideas or judgments handed down for many centuries.
IV.
Two "liberal" elements did appear in the indictment of monopolies:
the rhetoric of "free trade" and the belief in open markets implicit in
demands that prices not be manipulated or artificially controlled. Both
sible. The Year Books date from Edward I but the sixteenth century edition whidi Coke
used started only with the reign of Edward MII. IW. HOr.DSWOR7t, SOURCES AND Lal x&unRE
OF ENGLISH LAW 75-79 (1925).
134. 43 Assizes pl. 38 as cited in 4 IV. HoLuswoRTH, HISTORY OF E.LcShl LoW 376 (1922).
135. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economincs, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 38 (1937).
136. See 2 TUDOR ECONOMIC DOCUMENT 260 (R. H. Tawney & E. Power eds. 1924).
137. Bacon's statement in his Abridgement is quoted in H. Fox, MoxoPoLES AND PAT.
Frs's 21 n.6 (1949). For further information regarding the relationship bet'een forestalling
and monopolies, see V. MUND, OPEN MARKErs: AN EssE.TIAL OF FREe -,'mnrRpnsE 44-45
(1948).
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elements encouraged historians in their estimate of Coke as a propo-
nent of laissez-faire. But studied in context, both show him to have
been very much a man of his age. "Free trade" had a specific political
meaning and involved no rejection of the State; the belief in open
markets was a medieval legacy, underpinned by considerations foreign
to classical economics.
Instead of looking forward to a competitive and unregulated system
of enterprise, Coke looked back to the ideal of the body politic with its
emphasis on public good over private gain. This ideal pervaded much
of Tudor thought, transmitting the scholastics' distrust of middlemen
and speculators as well as the medieval notion of monopoly as a simple
act of hoarding or price fixing.188 Coke's notion was very similar, for
apart from royal patents, he knew no more sophisticated form of trade
restraint. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, no enterprise was
of sufficient size independently"9 to comer the market. Size did not
enter into the prevailing definition of monopoly 40 and problems of
efficiency and market division never even arose.' 4' The grounds for
censuring monopolies were therefore what they had always been: fear
of fraud and the pursuit of "excessive" gain. However tacitly, 42 Coke
believed that prices should be determined justly143 where all could
observe the true weight and quality of an item. Secretiveness seemed to
bespeak dishonesty, hence the desire for "open" markets.
Based on moral precept rather than an abstract theory of competitive
price determination, Coke's belief in open markets implied no under-
standing of laissez-faire. He came to this belief from assumptions
tangibly different from those of economic liberals, and he accorded
the State a positive and beneficent role they denied it. Whereas
"liberals" were confident that markets might best be kept open with-
out regulation and therefore urged the repeal of engrossing and fore-
138. The term "monopoly" originally covered all pacts by which merchants set prices
and created artificial scarcities. De Roover, Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A
Revision, 65 Q.J. ECON. 492, 498-511 (1951).
189. That is, without the sanction of royal protection.
140. See 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division I, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783 (1965).
141. For the most part, the problem of collusive agreements to fix prices did not arise
either; forestalling and engrossing were acts by one man without a partner.
142. It must be remembered that Coke never presented his ideas on economic policy
in any coherent form and that, like his contemporaries, he did not compartmentalize eco-
nomic, social and political theory.
143. The emphasis here is on the "justness" of prices, so that in time of economic crisis
or shortage, Coke supported the right to set prices nationally. The real question in the six-
teenth century was which institution ought to have final judgment as to price level-gilds,
corporations, courts or Council.
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stalling laws,1 Coke upheld those laws,145 convinced that if ever trade
were left free individuals would selfishly try to impose restraints. He
welcomed State efforts to prevent monopolies, just as he had welcomed
State efforts to maintain full employment and an adequate supply of
food.
It was the head of state, however, who created the most odious mo-
nopolies of all. Exclusive as well as restrictive, royal grants of privilege
aroused great protest. And because that protest was directed against a
form of central intervention, it found expression in peculiarly modem
rhetoric. A cry went up for trade free of royal privileges. It was sup-
posed to have been silenced by Elizabeth's concession of common law
jurisdiction. But it was not silenced and in his report of The Case of
Monopolies, Coke upheld the right of Englishmen to "freedom of trade
and traffic."
In view of his support for the major enactments of Tudor paternal-
ism, it must be clear that "free trade" meant something rather different
to Coke than to economic liberals. Implying no rejection of parlia-
mentary regulation, it meant in fact trade free from arbitrary and
exclusive privileges bestowed by the Crown. It was a political argu-
ment; Coke's citations in this section of his report of The Case of
Monopolies146 all involved efforts of the Crown to by-pass Parliament.
Many of those efforts had as little to do with restrictive privileges as
with unregulated trade. Wagner thought them entirely irrelevant and
indeed he called Coke a legal liar.147 But Wagner mistakenly evaluated
144. Of the important classical theorists, Adam Smith was most concerned about these
laws, for they were still in force when he wrote. He compared the fear of engrossing and
forestalling "to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft," observing that the statute
of Edward VI "by prohibiting as much as possible any middle man from coming between
the grower and the consumer, endeavored to annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise
is not only the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth but the best preventative
of that calamity." He attributed the enactment of the lw to popular odium agnt the
trader and the tendency in time of scarcity to impute distress to the avarice o te corn
merchant; he attacked the law as preventing the proper division of labor and imposing
injurious restraints on trade. See A. Szr, TiE W.Ara oF NATioNs, bk. IV, ch. 5 (1937).
145. See p. 1334 supra.
146. The "free trade" argument constituted only one section of the indictment of mo-
nopolies.
147. This charge runs throughout Wagner's discussion of The Case of Monopolies in
Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 ECON. Hisr. REv. 30, 3842 (1935).
"Wagner's difficulty was in part Coke's fault because many of the cases or statutory cita-
tions bearing on the "free trade" argument were not mentioned until Coke wrote his In-
stitutes at which time he was more daring in his political views than when he reported
The Case of Monopolies. Many of the citations discussed above appeared only in the In-
stitutes where their relevance specifically to "free trade" is not aha)s dear.
On the other hand, Wagner ignored Coke's injunction to interpret statutes according to
the intention of their authors. 'The rehearsal or preamble of [a] statute." Coke said, "is
a good means to find out the meaning of the statute, and as it were a key to open the
understanding thereof." 1 INsr. 079. Had Wagner followed Coke's injunction, he might
have found more logic to the citations than he did.
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Coke's citations in terms of preconceived, modern notions of free trade.
Coke cited,148 for example, 9 Edw. 3, c. 1 & 2 which provided that
all Merchants, Strangers and Denizens, and all other and every of
them... that will buy or sell Corn, Wines, ... Flesh, Fish... and
all other things vendible, from whence soever they come by For-
eigners or Denizens, at what Place soever it be, City, Borough,
Town, Port of the Sea, Fair, Market, or elsewhere within the
Realm, Within franchise or without, may freely without Inter-
ruption sell them to what Persons it shall please them ....
(Emphasis added.)
This statute was confirmed, as Coke went on to note, by 25 Edw. 3,
c. 2.149 Both seemingly enacted complete freedom of commerce. But the
reason Coke cited them was because they were to be observed notwith-
standing any charter or letter patent of the King to the contrary. That
this was his reason is suggested not only by the context of the citations,
but by his following reference to article 18 of Magna Carta.
According to his own discussion of the Charter,150 article 18 dealt
with the procedure to be followed in attaching the personal estates of
Crown servants who were also Crown debtors. Specifically, it provided
that
If any that holdeth of us lay-fee do die, and our sheriff or bailiff
do shew our letters patent of our summon for debt, which the
dead man did owe to us; it shall be lawful to our sheriff or bailiff
to attach and inroll all the goods and chattels of the dead, being
found in the said fee.., to the value of the same debt ... (empha-
sis added).
The King had previously attached the whole of the decedent's estate,
or as much as he could, not just the equivalent amount owed.151 Thus
article 18 limited the use of the King's letters patent.
Coke also cited articles 29 and 30 of Magna Carta.152 The former
was the "due process" provision, significant because it forbade the
King arbitrarily to seize a man's goods, and restricted his prerogative
powers. Article 30 granted safe conduct to merchants "to buy and sell
without any manner of evil tolts, by the old and rightful customs."
148. The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 88, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265 (K.B. 1602).
Wagner was wrong in saying Coke cited 9 Edw. 3, c. 21, though right in suggesting tile
irrelevance of that particular statute to Coke's argument.
149. The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 88a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265 (K.B. 1602).
150. Coke annotated the 1216 edition of the Charter in the Second Part of his
Institutes.
151. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 322-23 (2d ed. 1958).
152. 2 INsr. *1-78.
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It has been objected that the provision applied only to merchant
strangers.'5 This is true and even Coke recognized the scope of the
article.154 But if he was interested in trade free from arbitrary duties
imposed by the King and not free trade, then the limited scope of
article 30 would be irrelevant.
That Coke was interested in royal restraints is again suggested by
his supporting citations. In the Third Part of his Institutes, he men-
tioned the petition of the House of Commons to Richard II against the
special trading privileges granted to Yarmouth.}5 The petition urged
that such privileges contravened a statute recently confirmed. The stat-
ute was 2 Rich. 2, c. 1 which in turn confirmed 9 Edw. 3, c. 1, the
importance of which has just been noted. Coke also found a precedent
from the reign of Philip and Mary. They had granted a charter to
Southampton, making the town the sole port of entry for malmsey and
allowing it to levy a treble duty. But in 1560 the grant was deemed by
"all the justices of England" to be a "restriction of the liberty of the
subject" and "against the laws and statutes of the realm"-namely
Magna Carta, art. 30; 9 Edw. 3, c. 1; 25 Edw. 3, c. 2.150
The most controversial of Coke's examples was Peache's (or Peeche's)
Case,157 in which the Parliament of 1376 censured his patent for the
exclusive right to sell sweet wines at retail in London. One critic has
suggested that Peache was punished because of his connections with
John of Gaunt and that he was a victim of political rivalries.lta Another
has suggested that Peache was really punished for the flagrant use he
made of his privilege by charging extortionate prices.'3 Both observed
that Parliament challenged the use Peache made of his privilege and
not the King's right to grant the privilege. The decision in The Case
of Monopolies, however, asserted that extortionate prices were by defi-
nition a necessary result of monopoly and Peache's case provided evi-
dence to that effect. The political details of the fourteenth century
were of no interest to common lawyers in the seventeenth. And these
153. See IV. McKEcHNIE, supra note 151, at 400.
154. 2 INsr. 057.
155. 3 Isr. *181.
156. Id.
157. RoTmU PARPLamrNTogur, 50 Edw. 3, No. 33 (1376). Coke uas not the first to cite
this case. It was cited during the debates over monopolies in 1601. Sce Mr. Laurence Hide's
statement in the House of Commons, 2 TuDoR Eco.o.iac DOC.Utfl,,Ts 273 (R. H. Tawney
& E. Power eds. 1924).
158. Letwin, supra note 73, at 355, 358.
159. Wagner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 Ecoi. fisr. Frx%. go 41
(1935).
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details aside, the case revealed once again the danger of abuse in arbi-
trary interventions by the Crown.
Coke's citations all referred to attempts by the Crown to act without
Parliament. Had he wanted to make a generalized argument in favor
of unregulated commerce, Coke might also have cited statutory regula-
tions and monopolies having statutory sanction. 10 But he did not. And
one can only conclude that "freedom of trade and traffic" meant little
more than trade free from exclusive royal privileges; that Coke's mean-
ing fully accorded with parliamentary usage. In the early seventeenth
century, several bills for "free trade" were debated in the House of
Commons.1 1 Yet they too aimed only at broadening the membership
of trade companies or abolishing royal patents of monopoly. Members
who supported these bills never denied the efficacy of economic regula-
tion. None saw any inconsistency when Coke introduced "A Bill for
Free Trade"'16 2 in the same session he argued against the export of
wool, or when he declared freedom to be the life of trade' 0 3 in the
same session he argued against the import of Spanish tobacco.
Both in Parliament and in court, "free trade" was far too narrow to
permit a laissez-faire construction. It was a political slogan used by
Coke in a political context in his report of The Case of Monopolies.
Darcy had defended his privileges'0 as lawful emanations of the
Crown prerogative to regulate foreign trade and generally to act pro
bono publico. Neither Coke nor the King's Bench was prepared to
deny the legitimacy of this prerogative.6 5 But on the basis of common
law doctrine they (rightfully) voided all royal patents of monopoly and
not just Darcy's. This came perilously close to denying the Crown's
right to grant patents altogether, hence Coke's elaborate attempt to
justify the court's decision by demonstrating how frequently the Crown
had misinterpreted the public interest 0 and how frequently royal
160. Unlike industrial patents of monopoly, most municipal charters had received pr.
liamentary endorsement, as had many of the trading corporations.
161. In May of 1606, Parliament legislated against the Spanish Company in an "Act to
enable all his Majesty's loving subjects of England and Wales to trade freely into the
dominions of Spain, Portugal and France." 4 Jac. 1, c. 9 (1606). In 1621, the trade of the
Shrewsbury drapers was thrown open to all by an act "for the full liberty of buying and
selling of Welsh clothes." In all cases, the sweeping rhetoric of free trade applied to very
specific provisions.
162. This was the original title of the Statute of Monopolies.
163. 1 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 589 (April 24, 1621).
164. And Coke, as his counsel, had presented his clans to the court in 1603.
165. In fact, no one challenged this prerogative. The problem was to define Its scope.
See M. JUDSON, THE CRsIIs OF 7M CONSnrTION, especially ch. 1 (1949).
166. Technically, the Crown could still do no wrong; Coke and other critics of royal
policy all attributed errors to faulty advice. This led them to claim parliamentary say
over the choice of Councillors, although this was done not in the name of cabinet respon-
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actions had aroused protest. The "free trade" argument was used first
to fill a constitutional no-man's land and later to justify Parliament's
invasion of the royal prerogative.
V.
Provoked for twenty years by King James' flagrant disregard for the
common law, the Parliament of 1623 finally enacted the declaratory
Statute of Monopolies. 167 It was drafted principally by Coke who had
also chaired the Committee on Grievances which exposed the need for
legislative reform. 68 Except for a few political concessions, the statute
did very nearly embody Coke's views at the most radical stage of his
career. Yet it contradicts even the most considered aspects of the laissez-
faire thesis. It reveals Coke's complete unfamiliarity with modem
notions of competition and his willingness to sacrifice industrial prog-
ress to the needs of full employment, the selectivity of his opposition to
monopolies and once again, the political cast of that opposition.
In the statute, Coke defined monopoly as "an institution or allow-
ance by the King" and explicitly reserved to Parliament the right to
grant exclusive privileges.16 9 In addition, by drastically limiting the
scope of his attack on monopolies, Coke by-passed a splendid oppor-
tunity to create more competitive conditions of trade. Section 1 of the
statute seemed to void all institutions exercising exclusive control of
any product or form of commerce,
all monopolies and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters and
letters patent heretofore made or granted or heretofore to be made
or granted to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate
whatsoever, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, or using of
anything within this realm.
The comprehensiveness of this provision, however, was limited by
qualifying clauses. The Statute did not include printing, the produc-
tion of saltpeter, gunpowder and other products deemed essential to
sibility but of Parliament as the defender of the public interest. For Coke's belief (at least
in the 1620's) that Parliament was "accomptable to a publique trust! see id. 256.
167. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
168. Coke's role in the monopoly controversy is best explained by Elizabeth Read Foster
in The Procedure of the House of Commons against Patents and Monopolies, 1621-24, in
CONFaCT IN STUART ENGLAND 57-87 (W. Aiden & B. Henning eds. 1950).
169. Parliament did in fact make use of this right, as when in 1624 it incorporated the
Sheffield cutlers. G. CLARK, THE WEALTH oF ENGLAND. 1496-1760, at 12 (1947). Another
example, and one which particularly demonstrates the political aspect of the monopoly con-
troversy, is the granting by Parliament of Darcy's monopoly of playing cards to the Com-
pany of Card Players. See Letwin, supra note 73. at 367.
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the realm. Rights to the exclusive production of new processes or
machines were likewise excepted, for the Statute recognized the legiti-
macy of a copyright patent. 70 Section 9 protected the "liberties" and
customs of corporations so that it remained perfectly legal for a city
like London to prevent "foreigners" from keeping any shop or using
any trade within its limits.' 7 ' Section 9 also excepted companies which
enjoyed the exclusive privilege of trading with specific countries or in
specific commodities. Since most foreign trade was controlled by corpo-
rations, this provision excluded a particularly large class of monopolies.
The same class of monopolies dealt with in section 9 had likewise
been excluded from an act 7 2 framed by Commons in 1601, and Coke
had to consider Parliament's wish to preserve what remained of the
medieval corporate structure and even certain forms of trade privilege.
"Landed" lords of the upper house thought statutory proscription of
all corporations would constitute too great an infringement of the
King's prerogative. 73 "Patriotic" commoners were often shareholders
in trade companies and anxious to retain their privileges. Self-interest
apart, they foresaw only chaos if all commerce were free. In 1586-
1587, the privileges of the Merchant Adventurers had been revoked in
an attempt to grant "libertye" to English and foreign strangers to sell
cloth.' 4 The experiment failed as did the attempt in 1604 to "free"
the Levant trade from monopoly control."' 5
All these considerations plus the gravity of the trade crisis 10 in 1623
must have weighed on Coke as he formulated Statute of Monopolies.
But personally, he too seems to have believed the company system
essential to the maintenance of an ordered trade. He and other stalwart
critics of monopolies knew that in addition to exploiting exclusive
rights to specific routes or products, companies created the very condi-
tions essential to trade. The Crown at that time was unable to main-
tain fortresses or consuls or to protect merchants against confiscation.
170. See pp. 1355-58 infra.
171. Coke had upheld that principle in The City of London's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 12b, 77
Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1609).
172. A. Fmixs, ALDERMAN CocKAYNE's PRoJECr 149 (1917).
173. See Coke's report of a conference with the Lords in I JOURNAL OF THE House or
COMMONS 770 (April 19, 1624).
174. Gould, The Crisis in the Export Trade, 1586-1587, 71 ENG. Hism. REV. 212-22 (1956),
175. Durham, The Relations of the Crown to Trade under James i, 13 TMRNsAcroNs
oF TUm ROYAL HIrrOucAL SocErY (n.s.) 205-06 (1899).
176. Because the debate on monopolies coincided with a trade crisis, the consequences
of a sudden revocation of company privileges seemed particularly threatening. Both Coke
and Sir Dudley Digges agreed that this course would only hinder trade. I JOURNAL Or 'THE
HousE OF COMMONS 612 (May 7, 1621).
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Companies had come to provide these services and without them most
merchants would hardly venture forth.
For this reason and others,m Coke had approved Elizabeth's confir-
mation of the charter of the Russia Company.7 8 He had settled the
charter of the Virginia Company and approved that of the East India
Company 18 as well as approving the Exeter Merchants' right to trade
with France exclusive of all other merchants of Exeter.18' It might
perhaps be argued that Coke was then in the service of the Crown and
therefore obliged to endorse the policy of corporate monopolies. Yet
except for his later objection to the East India Company's export of
bullion, Coke never retracted his support of these companies. He
endorsed, unequivocally, corporations "erected for the Maintenance,
Enlargement, or ordering of any Trade of Merchandize . ,,-s18
Whether joint stock or regulated, virtually all those corporations
were monopolies. 83 Their charters bestowed the exclusive right to
trade with given countries or in given commodities or both. The
Levant Company, 84 for example, had the sole right of trade with
Turkey and Venice and the sole right to import currants and wines
from Candia; the French, Spanish and East India Companies were all
assigned territorial spheres. No competition existed among companies.
And more important, no merchant not a member could trade without
the permission of the company concerned." 5 If he did, he was liable
to prosecution as an "interloper."
177. One consideration, often overlooked, arose in Michelborne v. Michelborne, 2
3BrownL 8: Golds. 296, 123 Eng. Rep. 952 (C.P. 1609), in which Coke held that merchants
trading with infidel nations had to have a license from the King because of the danger of
being converted from the Christian religion. Infidel nations were by definition "unfriendly"
and it was therefore essential to provide some institutional guarantees of the safety of
traders. In addition, Coke and his contemporaries took into consideration whether or not
a company was opening up a new trade route. If so, they did not question the need for
corporate control.
178. His approval is cited in The Great Case of Monopolies (East India Co. v. Sandys),
10 Howells State Trials 371, 547-48 (1684). That was the case in which the validity of the
East India Company's charter was unsuccessfully challenged.
179. F. ALnTL"v, ENcLISH LAw AND THE ENAISScE 31 (1901).
180. The Great Case of Monopolies, 10 Howell's State Trials 371, 551 (1684).
181. Id. at 547.
182. Statute of Monopolies § 9, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
183. By far the greatest protest in Coke's day was directed against the joint stock com-
panies. Even Adam Smith later attacked them, relying on the petitions of merchants who
wanted to secure entrance into trade without the cost of purchasing shares. The cost of
these shares and also the limited number of subscriptions were actually the real problem.
For as W. R. Scott has shown, the shares were technically open to all. 1 W. Scort, Jorwr
SrocK COMPANiES To 1720, 122, 442-53 (1912). With regard to the regulated companies, most
criticism came from "outport" merchants, too far from the London-basW companies ac-
tively to participate in their trade.
184. 2 E. LIPSON, THE EcoNosuc Hisrony OF ENGLAND 338 (1947). That was the charter
of 1592.
185. Id. 222-25. Lipson aptly observes that "interlopers" were called "free traders."
Id. 228.
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Though surprising in light of the laissez-faire thesis, Coke accepted
this state of affairs and confined his criticism of trade companies to
specific abuses. He inveighed against the charter and practices of the
Merchant Adventurers 8 1 and he disapproved of most early experi-
ments in joint stock finance.1 7 But at no time did Coke express a desire
for more competitive conditions of trade or attack the company system
as such.18 8 His great concern was for employment, not competition, and
the companies Coke termed monopolies were simply those whose mem-
bership was too restrictive. At a meeting of the Privy Council in 1613,
he denounced the Merchant Adventurers saying "a thing granted to
a hundred is a monopoly if the rest is prohibited."18 9 Eight years later,
Coke again noted that their membership was grossly disproportionate
to the size of the market'90 and his attack on the Spanish Company
followed a similar line of reasoning.' 9' Exclusiveness led to unemploy-
ment and disorder and generally hindered trade whereas the true
function 92 of companies was good "order and government."
Again and again, Coke distinguished between trade regulation and
trade restriction, and he did so not only with regard to companies but
also corporate towns and boroughs and even gilds. 0 3 He objected when
186. Coke withdrew his support of the New Merchant Adventurers incorporated under
Cockayne because the charter, drawn up for them by Bacon, bestowed the right to force
and commit non-members without bail or appeal, and also because membership in the cor-
poration was highly restricted. A. Fais, supra note 172, at 245. For his criticism of the Old
Company see id., app. D.
187. Though he demurred on particulars, Coke generally approved the Commons' at.
tempt in 1604 to abolish joint stock companies. The attempt was made in April when the
House voted on a bill "for all merchants to have free liberty of trade into all countries,"
a bill which was directed only against the joint stock companies. After 1604, the bills
were even more particular in stipulating those companies which were to be reformed or
abolished. Durham, supra note 175, at 204-08.
188. The most sweeping statement Coke made was when he noted that "New Corpora-
tions trading into foreign parts, and at home, which under the fair pretence of order and
government, in conclusion tend to the hinderance of trade and traffique, and in the end pro.
duce monopolies." 2 INST. *540. Yet implicit in that statement was a distinction between
companies which were monopolies and those which were not-a distinction based on ad.
mission policy and unconcerned with the absence of competition among companies whose
membership seemed sufficient.
189. B. M. Caesar Papers, Add. MS. 14027 quoted in A. Flias, supra note 172, app. D. at
459.
190. 1 W. Scorr, supra note 183, at 221. This reference was to the company re-chartered
after the failure of the Cockayne project.
191. After peace had been restored with Spain and trade had revived, the membership
of the Company became relatively exclusive and it was precisely at that point, In 1606, that
Parliament freed the trade of the Company by throwing it open to all merchants. Coke
supported the legislation against the Company, as may be seen in 2 JOURNAL or Hous. or
LoRns 405 (April 1, 1607), 412 (April 12, 1607).
192. Section 9 of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624), acknowledged the
validity of those corporations "erected for the Maintenance, Enlargement, or Ordering of
any Trade of Merchandize . . . ." See also note 114 supra.




the Newbury Weavers made an ordinance that no person might use
the art of weaving within the town unless he had been apprenticed
with the town..'" He objected when the Ipswich Taylors tried to pre-
vent a qualified craftsman from practicing his trade until he had pre-
sented himself before them. These restraints, Coke said, were "against
the liberty and freedom of the subject, ... a means of extortion in
drawing money from them, either by delay, or some other subtle device,
or of oppression of young tradesmen, by the old and rich of the same
trade .... 195 At the same time, Coke firmly supported the right of gilds
to make "ordinances for the good order and government of men of
trades and mysteries ... ."190 Such ordinances might include stipula-
tions of quality or fair wages or marketing time. In the case of munici-
pal corporations, lawful ordinances or customs10T might include one
compelling any citizen, freeman, or stranger within London to bring
any broadcloth they wished to sell before the inspectors of Blackwell
Hall in order that they might inspect the quality of the cloth.1 s As he
said in Commons,199 "If a Corporation, for the better government of
the Town, not contrary to the Law; but, if any sole Restraint, then
gone [sic]."
The danger of "any sole Restraint" was arbitrary power and unem-
ployment, considerations which underlay Coke's antagonism to royal
patents of monopoly as well as to trade corporations. None of his
contemporaries disputed the legitimacy of a copyright patent so there
was nothing particularly modem about Coke's statutory provision.
True, he would have preferred limiting the term to seven rather than
fourteen years.200 But he would not have altered the conditions of the
grant, and the conditions differed greatly from those today. With few
194. Norris v. Staps, Hobart 210, 80 Eng. Rep. 357 (K.B. 1616). The provision of the
ordinance was far more restrictive than the Statute of Artificers and by creating unemploy-
ment in fact vitiated one of the purposes of that Statute. See text accompanying notes 216-17
infra, to the effect that by giving priorit to national policy, Coke was enhancing central
power and not contributing to te growt of lisez-faire.
195. The Tailors of Ipswich Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53, 54, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1220 (K.B.
1614).
196. Id.
197. Sometimes Coke sanctioned customs whose lawfulness he would not have recognized
had their substance been made by grant. The Chamberlain of London's Case, 5 Co. Rep.
62b, 77 Eng. Rep. 150 (K.B. 1590).
198. Id. at 63, 77 Eng. Rep. at 151.
199. 1 JoumAas oF THE HousE OF COMMONs 770 (1628).
200. Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogate and at Com-
mon Law, 12 L.Q. REv. 141, 153 (1896). According to Hulme, the effect of the Statute of
Monopolies was to confirm the practice of the Crown between 1561-1603 and the only
innovation was the imposition of a statutory limitation on the term of a grant. But the
Statute also disallowed the bestowal of privileges on those who imported rather than in-
vented new processes.
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exceptions, improvements in a method of production could not be
patented, for it was felt that the subject of a grant ought truly to be
a "new manufacture." In the Third Part of his Institutes, Coke ex-
plained that "if the substance was in esse before, and a new addition
thereunto, though that addition make the former more profitable, yet
is it not a new manufacture in law. ' 20 1 If patents for improvements
were sanctioned, then existing industries would be prejudicially af-
fected, craftsmen would be displaced and unemployment would result. 20".
One with a "capitalist mentality" might find it difficult to understand
this discouragement of initiative, but Coke's mentality was anything
but capitalist.
Indeed, his outlook was fully rooted in Tudor precept, trained to
balance deftly the needs of social harmony against innovation and to
value innovation or improvement in terms of its contribution to the
State. A desire for industrial self-sufficiency, not an individualistic
ethic, had justified copyright patents in the first place and this re-
mained Coke's criterion. When a contemporary proposed to introduce
the manufacture of salt into England,203 and when Zouch undertook to
preserve England's forests by making glass from coal instead of wood,201
Coke was more than willing to grant them exclusive rights of produc-
tion. He was so enthusiastic as sometimes to be deceived by the claims
of prospective patentees. Just as he had been deceived by Cockayne, so
he was deceived by Zouch, and did not foresee that the higher cost of
smelting glass with coal would raise prices, or that craftsmen skilled in
the old methods of glass production would be kept from working.20 5
These consequences-when apparent-were abhorrent to Coke, and in
1621 and in 1623 he condemned the patent which had since been trans-
ferred to Sir Robert Mansell, a court favorite. To save the bill, -00 he
201. 2 INsT. *184. See also 1 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON TilE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628.
29 (8th ed., 1824).
202. Part of Coke's concern was for the poor generally. He insisted that "common right
be done to all, as well poor as rich." 4 INST. *183. And he decried those who "ground the
face of the poor" by penal laws. 4 INST. *41. As judge, he went out of his way to
support hospitals and other charitable organizations. See, e.g., The Case of Sutton's Hos.
pital, 10 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B. 1612). For Coke's support of the Poor Law,
see 2 INST. *729.
203. ACTS OF THE PRsvy COUNCIL, 1615-1616, at 6, 7.
204. 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 987. T. MENDENHALL, THE SiRtwsntuIRY
DRAPERS AND THE WELSH WOOL TRADE IN THE XVI AND XVII CENTURIES 168 n.1 (193),
argues that Coke was inconsistent in his support of the glass patent of 1713.
205. Price, English Patents of Monopoly, I HARV. ECON. STUDIEs 70 (1913). Zouch and
his partners did succeed in using the method, and technically Coke and the Committee on
Grievances erred in condemning the patent as a "grievance in creation." 2 PROcaDINCS IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1620-1621, at 73 (May 14).
206. Price, supra note 205, at 76. For Coke's condemnation of the patent, see Foster,
supra note 168, at 73.
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recommended the exception of the patent from the Statute of Monop-
olies. But the precise terms of its exception invited prosecution by the
common law, and Coke explicitly urged -07 that the patent not be
renewed at the end of its term.
Significantly, Coke withdrew his support when he realized the patent
was not in fact being used to promote new methods of production.
Legitimate copyright patents were one thing, arbitrary privileges,
another. What Coke and his contemporaries found objectionable was
the bestowal of monopolies on court favorites, sycophants and others
who knew nothing of the trade which they controlled and who injured
craftsmen who did. They sought to remedy the ills which had devel-
oped in the administration of the patent system, but not to destroy the
system itself.
Coke and his colleagues had been young men at the time Elizabeth
initiated28 the policy of granting exclusive rights of production to
foreign craftsmen in order to encourage their immigration to England.
They knew that England lagged behind her continental rivals in
industrial skill, so much so that in 1562 the patent system was extended
to "industrious" denizens who either imported or invented new pro-
cesses. Thus far, Coke went along with both Tudor policy and practice.
But in the 1580's, abuses crept into the system.2 ° Licenses to sell as well
as to manufacture commodities frequently accompanied patents. Non
obstante clauses enabled monopolists to disregard statutory prohibi-
tions on the import of certain items and become exclusive traders in
those items.210 More important, Elizabeth now conferred privileges to
practice well-established trades. Craftsmen who had hitherto enjoyed
the right to work found themselves unemployed or forced to pay a
considerable sum to the patentee. Prices rose and often the quality of
goods deteriorated.
As usual, matters became worse under James. Not only did he per-
petuate his predecessor's abuses, he did so after the courts declared
monopolies invalid2 1 ' and after he himself endorsed the court's deci-
sion.2' 2 He was prodigal in his bestowal of privileges, most of which
207. 1 JoU.NAL oF TBE HousE OF ComMONs 696 (May 1, 1624).
208. There were earlier instances of Crown encouragement of new industries, but they
were unsystematic and the privileges conferred were in the nature of safety and safe-
passage to aliens.
209. Price, supra note 205, at 8-9.
210. For a good discussion of the royal dispensing power, see Birdsall, Non Obstante--
A Study of the Dispensing Power of English Kings, in ESSAYS Hi HxRoat' mD POUTiCAL
THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILIwAIN (1936).
211. The decision in The Case of Monopolies was handed down in 1602.
212. In 1610, James published his Book of Bounty, declaring monopolies to be void
and contrary to public policy.
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went to court favorites. Making them the beneficiaries of lucrative
privileges in no way enhanced their popularity. Resistance and evasion
became so rife that James granted his patentees additional wide dis-
cretionary power to search and seize rival produce.213 For all these
reasons, Parliament determined to free trade of the restrictions imposed
by monopolists. In 1597 and 1601, it protested the abuses of Elizabeth's
patentees.214 In 1604, it assumed the abuses to be a necessary corollary
of the grant,2 15 and for the next twenty years attempted to restrict the
prerogative power of the King.
The chronological progression of the parliamentary protest, the
limited scope of the Statute of Monopolies, the specific nature of the
grievance against industrial patents, all suggest that had Elizabeth and
James held to the original purpose of bestowing trade privileges, there
would have been no complaints. Coke aimed neither at creating a
"freer" economy nor at destroying its traditional corporate structure.
He wanted, basically, to protect the rights of Englishmen 10 and to
prevent individuals or institutions from pursuing policies inconsistent
with the newly imposed national standards. 217
With the Tudors there had begun a concerted movement towards
uniformity. Coke admired that movement and supported the whole
new structure of economic legislation. Loyalty to paternalist policy and
also to the common law in fact prompted his opposition to certain
monopolies. Historians may point to Coke's radical methods of protest
and suggest the later importance of his seemingly modern rhetoric. But
when they try to ascribe to Coke an anticipation of laissez-faire, they
misinterpret profoundly the nature of his thought. For Coke was inter-
ested in full employment and not efficiency; just prices and not compe-
tition. Far from searching for new economic concepts, he drew upon
the Commonwealth ideal, arguing consistently that "trade and traf-
fique cannot be maintained or increased without order and govern-
ment .... "218
213. H. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS 186-88 (1949).
214. For a fine discussion of the early parliamentary protest against monopolies, see
J. NEALE, ELIzaBr I AND HE PARLIAMENTS, 1584-1601 at 852-62 (1966).
215. This was impIicit in the decision of The Case of Monopolies. See section III supra.
216. That is, the right to work, the right to property, and the right not to be subjected
to abuses by privileged corporations.
217. Virtually all of the gild ordinances which Coke censured were more restrictive than
the provisions of the Statute of Artificers; corporate exclusiveness hampered the general
policy of full employment; the practice of forestalling raised prices and helped to create
scarcity, thus destroying the balanced polity the Tudors tried to establish. As suggested
throughout this article, Coke looked to corporate bodies to administer national policleg
hut not to take the initiative, especially if it proved injurious.
218. The Case of the City of London, 8 Co. Rep. 121b, 125, 77 Eng. Rep. 658, 663 (K,B,
1609).
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